Introductory Remarks
§2
This document is a draft of the introductory part of the forthcoming book Explaining
Experience In Nature: The Foundations Of Logic And Apprehension by Steven
Ericsson-Zenith. It constitutes the most accessible seventy-five pages or so (forty-two pages on your printer) of the
book with notes and references but it lacks formal details. If you are interested in reviewing the formal work then please contact Steven directly.
§3
In this chapter we present the subject of the book, our approach to the problems presented, and discuss the implications of the work.
The WorkThe subject, scope, and composition of the book. Explaining Experience In NatureThe content of the book and its objectives.
§4
The present inquiry explores a constructive explanation of consciousness in nature determined by natural laws and developed from first principles1. Our goal is to illustrate how consciousness comes into existence, the role that it plays in nature, and the mechanics of the broad range of behaviors that are its products.
§20
The foundation of this new construction is a novel account of experience in nature.
§22
By the term “experience” we refer to the basis of consciousness. It is that which is most familiar. It is common to all senses. It is the first thing and the last thing for each of us. Though strictly, according to the model we will present, the first and the last thing
for each of us is a sense, the primitive we will propose characterized by biophysical
structure.
§23
From the beginning we take the existential status of experience seriously. It is something that exists in the world.
A new primitive; the root of complexity.
§31
All the world derives from primitive nature. Primitive nature is currently inaccessible but three aspects of it are apprehensible and
universally covariant: these are mass/energy, gravitation, and a primitive of experience. The current work explores the introduction of this last aspect of primitive nature as a
necessary distinction for the explanation of the world that includes consciousness.
§34
In our model this universal primitive is an aspect of the world that affects physical
assembly simply by its presence. Although this primitive is inert, in the same way that gravitation is inert, it is the root of all complexity.
§37
The new mechanics we propose characterizes the products of a natural assembly against2 this previously unconsidered primitive.
§39
By analogy this new primitive has the same existential status as gravitation and mass/energy. It is a universal aspect of primitive nature just as gravitation3 is universal; and it is inert as gravitation is inert. Most important of all for us here, like gravitation it has a characterizable
effect upon the formation of physical structure.
Examining behaviors associated with consciousness.
§41
As we proceed we will examine the behaviors associated with consciousness as described by a new
mechanics. These behaviors are the emergent products of the unfolding world naturally engineered by this
mechanics and the evolutionary principle of natural selection. They include the obvious products of experience: the variety of sense, the behavior of organisms, and the forms of intelligence that underlie them.
§47
On our journey we will develop foundations for the formal characterization of the range of
behaviors that we consider. In that effort we develop a calculus for this new mechanics, inclusive of
biophysics. The objective of this calculus is to enable us to reason rigorously about the formation of sensory and motile structures, and their operation. With this understanding of individual organisms we are then able to suggest a model for reasoning
about their behavior in groups.
Challenges formalizing the model.
§51
We must navigate significant challenges before we can formalize our model. We will defend a claim that the established foundations of logic and geometry contain assumptions
that, if left unchallenged, limit our formal inquiry. This is because the intuitions upon which they are based relate directly to our
subject, they are assumptions concerning the nature of apprehension.
§52
These claims will lead us inevitably to review assumptions in the foundations of mathematical
physics. And these challenges are difficult because they reject cherished beliefs.
§53
For example, we will argue that the “orthogonality” pervasive in our mathematics4 is false and has the effect of misdirecting problem solving behavior in physics. And so we challenge the conventional notion of unlimited dimensions in contemporary physics.
§57
We argue that the Turing implementation of logic as computation is false and constrained by
limits that are fundamental to the world. To support this argument we show that the Turing implementation of logical machines is unlike the
biophysical implementation and unable to compete with the efficiency found there. To this end we offer a conjecture concerning the Church-Turing thesis. This conjecture illustrates how and why systems built with Turing Machines will produce
behaviors, our measure of results, that differ from the behaviors produced by our
mechanics.
§58
We will have made progress on our journey if we can demonstrate that the new calculus can predict
biophysical sensory and motile function. We will have proof of these theories in practice if we can use the mechanics described to
implement new sensory and motile technologies, machines that experience.
The Field Of EndeavorA summary of our field of inquiry.
§59
When consideration of logic goes beyond the effective techniques of syntax and semantic rules in symbolic systems to include the essential basis of apprehension and
operation of the mind it is more rightly called “semeiotic theory,” the study of “signs” .
§66
Semeiotic theory, the subject of logical positivism and pragmaticism, is a field of inquiry that develops general theories of signs and we develop such a
theory here. The theory is built constructively upon the natural mechanics of sense and motility that we
propose.
Differentiated experiences.
§68
There is some diversity and ambiguity in the literature concerning the exact definition of a
sign. We adopt the simplest and least ambiguous definition: a sign is simply a differentiated experience.
Physics, Ethics, Semeiotic.
§69
In his essay concerning human understanding the English philosopher John Locke divides the objects of our understanding into three distinct areas of intellectual
consideration: Physics, Ethics, and Semeiotic5.
§74
He puts it this way [1]:
| ❝ |
§75
All that can fall within the compass of human understanding, being either, FIRST, the nature
of things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation
[Physics]: or, SECONDLY, that which man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary
agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happiness [Pragmatics or Ethics]: or,
THIRDLY, the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is
attained and communicated [Semeiotics] .
John Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (1690) |
§76
Locke saw these as three distinct areas of study.
| ❝ |
§77
For a man can employ his thoughts about nothing, but either, the contemplation of THINGS
themselves, for the discovery of truth; or about the things in his own power, which are his
own ACTIONS, for the attainment of his own ends; or the SIGNS the mind makes use of both in
the one and the other, and the right ordering of them, for its clearer information. All which three, viz. THINGS, as they are in themselves knowable; ACTIONS as they depend on us, in order to
happiness; and the right use of SIGNS in order to knowledge, being [utterly] different, they
seemed to me to be the three great provinces of the intellectual world, wholly separate and
distinct one from another.
John Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (1690) |
A continuum from physics through biology including signs.
§78
We will show, however, that these three are not distinct. An intellectual understanding of one is intrinsically dependent upon an intellectual
understanding of the others. Put another way, we will show that there exists a continuum from elementary
physics through biology, covariant with the embodiment of signs, and the inevitable
and volitional behaviors that arise.
Genetic disposition mitigated by convention.
§79
We will show that the behaviors of organisms are the natural product of genetic disposition in
its environment, mitigated by the embodiment of
conventions, the embodiment of signs.
§80
Thus, for us, semeiotic theory is naturally first among sciences. It is through semeiotic theory that we infer the physical basis of nature as well as the
operation of individuals and behavior of those individuals in groups.
It deals with how and why we understand the world.
§81
It is semeiotic theory that leads us to a sense that captures an understanding of the
world. The product of this semeiosis, the semeiotic process embodied by an individual, are the marks, the subjects of signs, that represent our expression and analysis of that sense6.
Against Prevailing ViewsOur model and approach challenges prevailing views.
§90
The present work challenges a number of prevailing views. In particular, we make the following observations:
§91
The failure of a logical reduction cannot lead to supernatural conclusions. By necessity such failures lead us to reconsider, and ultimately
revise, the basis of the logical construction in which the reduction
failed.
§92
The mechanism of logical differentiation in biophysical structures produce results that
differ from those produced by the mechanism of logical integration.
§93
This difference arises in implementation at scale and is due to the distinct mechanisms
of logical differentiation and integration.
§94
In essence the primitive we propose enables a fundamentally different computational
mechanics: a manifold, with no storage required, of parallel
“computation” against which nonlocal differentiated results form
in a physical structure closely bound to associated action potentials in a system of
recognition.
§95
The classical logic of integration is limited and unable to compete with this simple
efficiency.
§96
This is a controversial claim and, if it holds, it is a negative result for
computer science.
§97
This same mechanism also produces results that differ from those of
“computational complexity” in explanations of physical behavior
involving sentience.
§98
“Computational complexity,” the product of uniform classical mechanics, has no differentiating physics
or logical constraint. Without such constraint the behavior arising from computational complexity is different
than that predicted in our model.
§99
This too is a controversial claim and will be a negative result for computer science. Later we discuss the implications of these claims to the Church-Turing Thesis.
§100
There remains the question as to whether heuristic machines in efficient switching
materials are more or less efficient for certain end results than the mechanisms
referred to above.
§101
Despite this, and despite the manifest success of chess playing machines, we
conjecture that conventional machines implementing heuristics cannot ultimately solve
problems involving recognition for reasons that are fundamental to the world. By this we refer to the basic ability of organisms, that is proportional to their
size and complexity, to consistently recollect similarity in their environment
and act appropriately.
§102
Certain basic notions in the language of mathematics, derived from received
authority, are false intuitions. One such notion is the geometric notion of perpendicular
“orthogonality” that leads to unconstrained dimensions in
analytic algebra.
§103
We will not present it in these introductory remarks but later we present an experimental
geometry as the basis of our calculus that does not use the conventional notion of
orthogonality; instead of an unlimited dimensional geometry that starts
with “point,” “line,” “plane” we begin with “length” and derive
“plane” and “point” as necessary
distinctions. This geometry was considered in part earlier by Ernst Mach as a geometry in which length
is the fundamental metric[2]. The geometry is unrestricted by perpendicular orthogonality yet it still provides solids, planes, and unique points. It provides a new coordinate system well suited to our task.
§104
A resulting bias in the foundations of mathematics, the acceptance of an unlimited
“dimensionality” in analytic algebra, leads to the
misdirection of problem solving behavior in mathematical physics.
§105
As a consequence we argue, consistent with Einstein, and Godel[3], that the notion of “time” is merely a way of speaking about
the world. It follows then, consistent with Mach[4] and Einstein, that the notion of
“space” is also. For us “spacetime” is simply a way of speaking about mass/energy.
§106
Finally, and perhaps most controversial, we claim a necessary extension of
physics, a universal basis of experience whose role in nature is the
production of physical complexity.
§107
In the following sections we address each of these observations in sufficient detail to justify
their further investigation.
Rescuing Reductionism
§108
The failure of a logical reduction cannot lead us to supernatural conclusions. By necessity such failures lead us to reconsider, and ultimately
revise, the basis of the logical construction in which the reduction
failed.
§109
The present work advocates the return of certain scientific principles[5] and the rejection of metaphysics, in the pursuit of a
systematic and rigorous logical construction of the world. We pursue the development of such a construction.
§110
Logical constructions of this kind approximate the way things are with increasing degrees of
completeness; in a continuous refinement that eliminates
contradiction and defers to the evidence.
§111
Reductions within such frameworks must lead to verifiable predictions about the behavior of
the world. The failure of such reductions by evidence or contradiction cannot lead us to supernatural
conclusions. By necessity such failures lead us to reconsider and ultimately revise the basis of
the construction in which the reduction failed.
§112
This view, surprisingly perhaps, is contrary to prevailing views in contemporary
science proposed by several leading emergence theorists and some physicists.
§113
Advocates of these views include mathematicians Stephen Wolfram[6] and Gregory Chaitin[7], biologist and complexity theorist Stuart Kauffman[8], and cognitive theorist Douglas Hofstadter[9], all of whom have written books on the subject. However, the argument itself is not new[10].
§119
According to these accounts the basis of experience is not universally primitive but is
solely a product of the evolved parts assembled. Typically, it is manifest in these arguments as an identity with some observable
phenomenon. And it is important to note immediately that experience in these theories has no role in the
world.
§120
Emergence theories of experience echo the philosophy of mind known as identity
theory attributed to Herbert Feigl (1950s)[11][12] and others7.Feigl is also a member of “the Vienna Circle” that we will come
to hear much about in our historical narrative. These theories argue that there is not only a one-to-one correspondence between conscious
events and physical events but that the physical events are in fact the conscious events. In these models there is no mystery to the physical events involved they are simply the
product of conventional mechanics.
Identity and epiphenomena are indistinguishable.
§123
An older and frequent alternative argument made by some philosophers is that experience is an epiphenomenon[13], a phenomenon that arises as the extra product of known mechanics and
evolutionary theory.
§124
Here we will treat theories of identity and epiphenomena in the same way. We do so because the two theories are logically indistinguishable. Whether experience is the incidental product of evolved mass/energy or the events of
mass/energy themselves simply cannot be detected. What is more, if one or the other is in fact the case then the matter here
can never be resolved.
§125
In both models no aspect of experience is existent prior to the physical assembly that
embodies it and experience plays no role in the mechanics of observable events. Experience is simply along for the ride. As long as these theories provide no role for experience in nature they amount to a form of
dualism and no real progress on the matter has been made.
Materialism assumes all essential things discovered.
§126
The unspoken premise of these models is materialism. We take the view of materialism to imply a belief that our physical models are complete in
all important respects. According to this view contemporary physical theory captures all the essential
things of the world.
Chaitin illustrates the problem.
§127
Materialism is justified in a version of emergence theory by taking the position that levels of constructive complexity introduce new
phenomena into the world and, to quote Chaitin[14]:
| ❝ |
§129
When you go to a higher level, the lower level may be irrelevant.
Gregory Chaitin. P.151, Sensual Mathematics,Conversations with a Mathematician. (2002) |
§130
In correspondence with the author Chaitin says (quoted with
permission):
| ❝ |
§131
... physicists and cosmologists are doing metaphysics again. Have you heard of the string theory landscape or the inflationary universe multiverse or
Max Tegmark's ideas on parallel (all mathematically possible)
universes? The general idea is that only the space of all possible physical laws is of
interest, and the particular laws of this universe are not of great
interest, since it is only, so to speak, our address in the
multiverse of all possibilities.
Gregory Chaitin. A New Kind of Metaphysics. (2008) In correspondence with the author. |
§132
This correspondence illustrates two issues that we will address here. The first is the acceptance of the supernatural, metaphysics. This is due to a failed reduction and a failure to recognize the necessity to review the
basis of the construction that leads to it. The second is a semeiotic issue that relates to how assumptions of received authority in our
mathematical formalism, in this case in the notion of unlimited
orthogonality, has misdirected problem solving behavior in mathematical physics.
§133
The idea of parallel universes or unlimited dimensions is based upon a false
intuition, it is a clear and unsupportable fantasy. And while the idea of multiple universes in Inflationary Theory (where expansion
of the world leads to units separating at faster than the speed of light)
is intriguing there is little justification for any claim that the laws within these
“universes” are not precisely the same.
New properties do emerge but maintain functional dependence.
§134
New properties of nature obviously do emerge and there is an equally obvious
correspondence, an identity, between the physical assembly that manifests the
property and the property itself. However, from the constructive point of view that we will follow in this work
nothing new is brought into the world except a new assembly of its essential parts.
Laws and PrinciplesThe uniformity of natural law.
§135
A central premise for us is that the natural laws are uniform, that they are
everywhere the same. We argue that this uniformity is profound, the cause of perceived
universals. And our model relies upon it.
§136
The world then, in our model, is a natural construction according to the laws of primitive nature (a priori determinants) and the principles (posterior determinants) that arise in the combination of these laws.
§139
In accord with the laws of conservation and equilibrium in thermodynamics these
emergent properties transform, their structures change, and these new forms play
a continuing role in the physical systems in which they appear.
§140
Yet in the argument we have heard from contemporary emergence theory experience has none of
these features. It translates to no other form and it plays no continuing role.
Materialism forbids discovery.
§141
The emergence theory expounded by Chaitin and others is the product of a failed reduction. It is the inevitable logical consequence of a strict adherence to a materialist
construction, a construction that forbids discovery in the foundations of the
world.
The necessary expansion of physical theory.
§142
To escape this inevitable conclusion, since it is clearly inadequate, we are
required to expand our physical theory, to change the basis of our logical
construction of the world as the philosopher of science Rudolf Carnap (as we
will hear shortly), and contemporary physicist Roger Penrose[15][16], have anticipated:
| ❝ |
§143
... it seems to me that a fundamental physical theory that lays claim to any kind of
completeness at the deepest levels of physical phenomena must also have the potential to
accommodate conscious mentality ... My arguments demand that this missing theory must be a non-computational theory
...
Roger Penrose. 34.7,The Road to Reality. (2004) |
Changing The Operational Basis Of Logic And ApprehensionThe mechanisms of sensory differentiation in biophysics necessarily produce results that
differ from those produced by the mechanisms of logical integration in traditional theories
of computation.
§144
We propose a revision to the operational basis at the foundations of logic. The proposal is not novel. It is, in fact, the dominant view of logicians prior to the current era.
§145
We will present an historical narrative that illustrates this divide in
logic, placing the strong locality of computational logic against the
nonlocality manifest in our sensory experience. At the center of this narrative, representing each side of the debate, is the work
of Alan Turing and Rudolf Carnap.
Producing different results.
§146
This divide is mechanistic and fundamental to the implementation of logic. Critically, we claim that the results produced by these two views differ.
§147
There are two aspects of conventional logical machines to consider: integrative logic and computational complexity.
§150
Integrative logic is the logic of computer systems. The results it produces are aggregations of strongly localized truth values. A result is a “truth” value.
§151
The study of “computational complexity” looks at behaviors produced by
these systems in the highly parallel case, where there are, at least
conceptually, many such logical machines working concurrently and uniformly
applying simple rules. Examples are fractals and algorithms such as Conway's game of life[17]. The result is some characteristic behavior.
A manifold of parallel computation is enabled.
§152
The different results produced by differentiation arise at scale because the primitive we
propose enables a manifold of parallel “computation” formed against our
primitive in a physical structure of sense and associated action potentials. It is unified and storage free implementing cognition and motile behavior. Because it relies on these essential features of our physics it cannot be simulated by
conventional machines.
Limits of conventional operations.
§153
Computational complexity is not constrained in this way. It has no physics of nonlocal differentiation and no logical constraint. There is no point at which the system produces a nonlocal differentiation of the kind seen in
sensory architectures.
§154
The converse is the case for logical integration. Logical integration is constrained by the rules of logic and forced to a localized
reduction, a final aggregation of the logical parts, a single truth value. In this case logic is forced to take steps too far and is unable reduce across a manifold of
the kind we propose.
§155
This difference then derives from the nature of locality in these logical mechanisms and the
effect introduced by the primitive we propose. This is aided by the fact that storage, required in the Turing model, is not
required in our model because there is a direct covariance between the structure of the
physical manifold and cognition/recognition enabled by the primitive.
The basis of memory and the recollection of similarity.
§156
Since the action of a given manifold will always produce the same sense we also have the
basis of memory. And we get the recollection of similarity for free, structures partially reformed
will produce a partial sense; providing a foundation for analogy. In such an architecture there is no need for storage.
§157
Action potentials are directly associated with the recollection of similarity. Action behaviors occur either at the point of recognition or when physical circumstances
require the organism to modify behavior, a forced collapse to a decision point at
which the organism senses what it anticipates and acts accordingly.
The nature of the difference.
§158
We judge this difference then not by some perceived result from conventional symbolic logic
but by resulting behavior. Specifically, it is not that the perceived truth values of logical statements
differ in the two mechanics but rather that the truth values are concurrent, nonlocal
coexisting differentiations distributed across a physical structure, and at scale
classical Turing computations cannot deal with this concurrency and nonlocal decision
making.
The limits of computational complexity.
§159
The power of computational complexity is often cited as a sufficient explanation for complex
behaviors. We certainly accept the fluid and solid behaviors that arise this way from the uniformity of
natural law in classical mechanics. But computational complexity provides no account for the manifest nonlocality in
sense, it provides no account of experience in nature. And this should be the most compelling reason to reject computational complexity as the
explanation of nonlocal behavior in sensory architectures.
§160
Emergent behavior by the application of simple uniform laws is a necessary part of our
explanation but it is logically insufficient if those laws are constrained to those of
computation or classical mechanics. The limits of computational complexity are, in fact, that it is not limited by the
natural differentiating constraints that we propose.
The limits of integrative logic.
§161
It is certainly not necessary in biology to integrate all the results before action is taken
in our model, the distributed logic in our mechanics is bound to the distributed
action potential and constrained by the physical structure. In terms of efficiency Turing computation is unable to benefit from the unified nonlocal
differentiations freely available in biophysical structure according to our model.
§162
In other words, the concurrency we suggest is not merely the functional
composition of computations but intrinsic to logical differentiation.
Intrinsic concurrency, not “entanglement.”
§163
To avoid confusion we steer clear of suggesting that this mechanism be called
“entanglement,” a term used in Quantum Mechanics to refer to an observer based
phenomenon.
§164
If we analyse the concurrency of these manifolds with classic process algebra[18], and we will use just two processes P and Q to represent two
points on our manifold, it suggests the type:
§165
P || Q.
§166
Processes P and Q are concurrent and share events in the set of
events they may perform (in their respective “alphabets” ) and these
events they must perform together.
§167
However, this type of mechanism is unlikely since it requires a direct
implementation of the synchronization involved and a single common event. The synchronization mechanism that we propose here is a uncommon event and the result of
physical structure formed against an inert primitive absent in other models. The deformations of this structure characterize sense and construct against it an associated
action potential. It is the shaping of this manifold that leads to synchronized behavior in its continuous
deformations.
§168
There is then an intrinsic unity across the behavior of the representative processes
P and Q born of their physical structure against the primitive
we propose. This “action potential,” a complex event of the manifold, leads to a collective unified response.
§169
By analogy this is precisely the same kind of covariant behavior that constrains
computational complexity in the gravitational field.
§170
The difference in result then would be illustrated by, for example, the direction
an organism takes as the result of a given environmental input. We suggest, essentially, that organisms implemented with Turing machines will fail
where organisms implemented with our new mechanics will survive.
§171
Our model suggests a new way to view the structure and architecture of neurons. It suggests that the complex and dynamic manifold constructed by the neuron's cell structure
along with the manifolds formed by collections of neurons and other cells is the method of
memory and refining thought, a particular manifold configuration corresponding to
a differentiated recollection of similarity and motile response. Hence no storage is required in conventional terms.
§172
First we observe a manifest nonlocality in sense that is explicitly unaccounted for in the
work of Alan Turing[19]. This nonlocality is most readily observed in any visual scene of the least complexity. The scene does not reduce to a point. In addition, while observing the scene other senses are present. We can hear the music of Beethoven and taste the sweet honey while observing the sunset. This unified differentiation is not a feature of the Turing model of computation or
computational complexity.
Covariance of sense and motility.
§173
Next we observe that sense and motility are covariant. This is not the same as saying that there is an identity but only that the two phenomena are
mutually effective in precisely the same sense that the gravitational field and mass/energy
exhibit general covariance.
§174
The manifest effect of gravitation characterized by the curvature of Einstein's
“spacetime” is that observed by Newton, any two bodies
appear to have a mutual attraction that varies, roughly, as the inverse
square of the distance between them.
§175
It's important to note here the nonlocal nature of gravitation and our new primitive. The gravitational effect is a covariant differentiation and this is similar to the effect
that we propose.
§176
The manifest effect of our proposed primitive, however, is more subtle. Clearly mass/energy is again an equal player in the game. It's structure and behavior in this case is exactly that which characterizes the form of
sense just as its structure characterizes the form of the gravitational field.
Evolution toward an ever richer characterization of sense.
§177
The manifest effect of our proposed primitive, the role that it plays in
nature, is the formation of motile structures constructing, by natural
selection, an ever richer characterization of sense.
§178
In other words, natural selection does the rest because richer motile sensory
systems provide a survival advantage. If our model holds, an organism will always turn toward the richer
characterization of sense, whatever behavior this may imply in the context of the
organism in its environment.
In cell forms and membranes.
§179
The basic elements of these structures are the cellular forms familiar to us in biophysics
and an even richer characterization comes from manifolds of these cells when assembled
together into membrane structures that develop individuated senses and other motile
structures in an organism.
§180
This individuated structure of sense, a physical differentiation against our primitive
evolved in the cause of an organism's structure, is dependent upon the structural
form of a collection of cells but is independent of the individual cells that form the
manifold. Cells can be replaced by equivalent cells and the sensory manifold remains intact.
Why you do not feel what I feel.
§181
This individuation is critical and explains why it is that you do not feel what I do despite
the universal nature of the primitive8. The focus of the sensory structures is directed toward a particular characterization and this
effectively isolates that sense to the individual organism. Similarly, in the formation of complex organisms such characterizations can
be isolated to subsystems of the structure.
§185
To state the proposal more directly in the familiar case: a flexible sphere in some medium forms a simple manifold of sense, a physical
structure in which the primitive we propose can demonstrate its role. A simple deformation of the surface of this sphere, in conjunction with the sense
produced by such a deformation, that is beneficial to the survival of the
structure in its environment is enough to begin the process of natural selection in that
environment that leads to more complex organisms.
§186
On their own these simple manifolds can evolve into single cell microorganisms. Such microorganisms eventually evolve complex receptors, motor skills, and genetic architectures in the support of the various characterizations of sense in deformations of their
structures. This mechanism explains, for example, how and why bacteria migrate a glucose
gradient. Bacteria possess a simple sensory mechanism characterized by the response to glucose and tied
to the motile actions required to stimulate the sense further.
§187
The primitive extends this architecture of sense across many cells so that similar cells can
be an element of a larger manifold, a biophysical membrane in which
the sense is characterized and the corresponding behaviors supporting motile action
exist.
Biophysical implementation of logic.
§188
Thus the biophysical implementation of logic by this model is intrinsically bound to the form
and behavior of physical structure and cannot be localized into interpretations of bits and
bytes.
§189
This is true even though we are able to invent such interpretations as the produce of
reason, as ways of speaking about the world. Such symbolic systems, based upon a conception of truth that reduces to a cognitive
point representing a decision or proof, are unable to perform the direct
connection between highly distributed unified sense and action that comes for free in
natural implementations in the manifolds that we describe. In other words, something essential is lost in such an interpretations.
A conjecture concerning heuristic machines.
§190
There remains the question of whether heuristic machines in fast switching materials perform
with more or less efficiency than the mechanics described above. We conjecture that they cannot. Specifically, we claim that despite the success of chess playing
machines; heuristic machines cannot ultimately solve the problems of
recognition for the reasons, fundamental to the world, described
above.
§191
This intuition is based upon the obvious benefits of sensory differentiation that is bound to
motile action and requires no storage architecture, against the disadvantage of
the need to scatter and gather results in concurrent systems that implement classical
logic. We consider the nature of a formal proof of this claim.
Identifying Bias In The Foundations Of MathematicsCertain basic notions, such as conventional “orthogonality,” in the language of mathematics, derived from received authority, are
false. Assumptions in mathematics concerning apprehension.
§192
To enable a new mechanics that provides the characterization of the model we have just
outlined we must first address issues in the foundations of mathematics that relate to
apprehension. Certain notions in the language of mathematics, derived from received
authority, contain assumptions about our apprehension of the world that our model can
inform. If left in place these false intuitions will compromise our calculus.
Rejecting perpendicular orthogonality.
§193
The first and perhaps most significant of these notions is that of perpendicular
“orthogonality.”
§194
We will define “orthogonality” here broadly as the logical relation of one
concept to another that asserts that the concepts do not intersect anywhere in their
development, though they have a common conceptual
“starting” point. The example analogy is the notion of intersecting lines.
§195
This notion is a familiar foundation in geometry and algebra, generally pervasive
in our mathematics, and intrinsic to Cartesian systems. It is a notion that derives from our earliest mathematical considerations. But the justification for this notion is an intuition nurtured solely by received
authority.
An experimental geometry as the basis of our calculus.
§196
Here we will argue that this orthogonality, leading to unlimited geometric
“dimensions,” is a false intuition and simply a way of speaking about the world.
§197
We will describe an experimental geometry that has a different orthogonality with naturally
finite dimensions; equally capable of characterizing physical structure. It is a geometry predisposed to characterizing cellular forms and their structure as
manifolds. From this same geometry we will introduce a number theory that eliminates infinities and
provides an analytical algebra that we currently propose as the basis of our calculus. Instead of an unlimited dimensional geometry that starts with “point,” “line,” “plane” we begin with “length” and derive “plane” and
“point” as necessary distinctions.
Must apply to all physical systems.
§198
For this mathematics to gain acceptance it must apply to all physical systems. However, we will not require that it be convenient to apply to human
affairs. In addition to our new mechanics, therefore, it should be possible using the new
geometry to re-characterize General Relativity but it is not necessary, for
example, for the derived new formalism to be convenient to use in trade and
commerce.
§199
We will also investigate the implication of our proposal to conventional logic. In particular, we look into the implication to formal logic of nonlocal
differentiation distributed across unified manifolds. This may enlighten us, for example, concerning the nature and apprehension of
formal completeness.
§200
We will find other issues in the foundations of mathematics but, for the most
part, these have been explored by others. In particular, when dealing with what we will call “inevitable
behavior,” the kind of determinism, unavoidable behaviors, produced by our
mechanics, we will take a position that probability is epistemic. That is, we will adopt the view that probability theories are a way of
speaking about the world.
Epistemic PrimacyThe source of that which is most certain is the refinement of concepts as necessary
distinctions and ways of speaking.
§201
In everything that we describe here, as there must be in all scientific
work, there are base assumptions concerning the content of what we say, the
way we speak about the world and the existential status of that referred
to. So to be clear we briefly state our epistemic model here and we will explore it in more
detail in the following section on our model of existence.
Necessary distinctions and ways of speaking.
§202
We place epistemic primacy, the source of that which is most certain, with the
refinement by the mechanics we propose of “necessary distinctions” and note that such a distinction must be drawn between necessary distinctions
themselves and their expression as “ways of speaking” about the world. “Necessary distinction” is itself a necessary distinction and
“way of speaking” is itself a way of speaking and the distinction
between the two is a necessary one.
§207
A necessary distinction is distinguished by its “force” upon us. A way of speaking is distinguished by its “force” upon the world.
Distinct existential status.
§208
It should be clear that ways of speaking do not possess the existential inferences of
necessary distinctions. And it should also be clear that all that we say is a way of speaking about the world until
the distinctions to which that speech refers, the necessary distinctions that are
claimed, have impressed themselves upon us. And this must not be achieved merely by the force of what we say but by the evident truth. Thus necessary distinctions and ways of speaking are both products of apprehension in our
mechanics. They are elements of our epistemology.
§209
Let us briefly draw here an example from the work that will follow. We will claim that mass/energy, gravitation, and the primitive that we propose are necessary distinctions, aspects of primitive
nature; while we will claim that space and time are simply ways
of speaking about mass/energy.
Distinguishing necessary distinctions and ways of speaking.
§210
How are we to distinguish one from the other? In some cases it is easy enough, “house” is a necessary distinction while “home” is
a way of speaking, often about houses. Often we feel ways of speaking are necessary distinctions because they represent cherished
beliefs. We defer to received authority, as here we claim is the case for the notion of
unlimited orthogonal dimensions.
§211
We will contend here that a necessary distinction can always be distinguished from a way of
speaking by the definition we have provided above. A necessary distinction is distinguished by its “force” upon us
independent what people say.
§212
You may hesitate and say that the three primitive aspects of the world mentioned above do not
themselves have a force upon us since nowhere can they be found in distinction. Nowhere can I find mass/energy alone or gravitation or even the primitive we propose. Surely they are not distinctions but are also ways of speaking about the
world, the product of reason alone?
§213
The answer is that they are indeed necessary distinctions, for without them there
are no other distinctions. Thus necessary distinctions are the elements and components of a logical construction
referencing an existential status that is not born of ways of speaking about the world.
§214
Ways of speaking about the world can be a very useful means of making progress in areas of
uncertainty but it is of paramount importance that we call them out and do not endow that
which they reference with an undue status.
§215
As a practical matter do not let this concern you too much. However, it is mentioned here because we will use this distinction between
necessary distinctions and ways of speaking throughout and in a very particular way in our
inquiry.
The Misdirection Of Problem Solving Behavior In PhysicsThis bias in the foundations of mathematics leads to the misdirection of problem solving
behavior in mathematical physics.
§216
Combined, these observations suggest that problem solving behavior in
mathematical physics has been misdirected by the formal language that it uses.
Dimensionality a way of speaking about the world.
§217
In particular, the acceptance of unconstrained
“dimensionality” as the basis of formal physical description is often
given the existential status of a necessary distinction when this has no basis.
§218
Despite words of caution from many, including Einstein and Godel, there is wide
acceptance that time is a necessary distinction and that the perpendicular
“dimensions” of space are more than a simple pragmatic, a
useful way of speaking about the world.
Pedagogy leads to false acceptance.
§219
The way we teach physics, General Relativity in particular, indoctrinates students
and the general public with the notion. For most students and public “spacetime” is an existent phenomenon and not
simply a convenient way of speaking about the world as Einstein had suggested in his
original presentation of the subject[20].
Leads physics into fancy.
§220
The received authority of unlimited dimensionality has led to serious and intriguing
mathematics, much of which has proven useful, but it has also led to physical
proposals that would otherwise be rejected as simple nonsense.
§221
“Many-worlds” theories and some “parallel universe”
theories, relying upon the authority of unlimited orthogonality, abound. These fantasies have entered into popular culture as plausible conceptions of the world and
yet they have no obvious merit beyond their entertainment value.
§222
The force of received authority at these fundamental levels has led many physicists, and
mathematicians such as Chaitin, into a Wonderland as rich in fancy as any faced by Alice[21].
Quantum Mechanics physically vacuous.
§223
The worst of it is Quantum Mechanics itself where we deal entirely with the past and the
future and not at all with the present, failing to observe the necessity that
consideration of the past and the future is physically vacuous.
§224
The results of Quantum Mechanics are, in our view, simply a matter of record.
Existential ThinkingAn existential model that includes experience as more than a spectator. Uniformity and DistinctionThe uniformity of natural law and existential distinction in our model.
§225
If dualism[22] then is to be rejected, and
experience is not to be dismissed, there is a necessity that in our new
construction an element of that which we liberally label consciousness is a
primitive aspect of the world. This being the case our new primitive must play a role in the formation of physical
structures.
Effects later in the evolving cosmology.
§226
Like gravitation, the effect of this aspect of primitive nature do not become
manifest until later in the development of the universe. Since this effect appears much later in the evolving cosmology this primitive aspect must be
considered a much “weaker” influence than the gravitational field.
§227
As discussed in the previous section, these effects can be characterized as a
sensory and motile manifold.
Existential status derived from primitive nature.
§228
In the model of natural law that we will follow here the features of the world derive their
existence, their existential status, from a strict functional dependence9. Ultimately that dependence reduces to aspects of primitive nature.
§231
This strict dependence implies that the universal properties of the world are existentially distinctthe product of this uniformity alone.
No observable discontinuity in the uniformity of natural law.
§233
This uniformity of natural law is a base assumption of our model. We argue for this uniformity by observing the absence of observable discontinuity in the laws
of nature. Nowhere is there an observable discontinuity in natural law and our model would be falsified
by the discovery of one. For example, if we discover galaxies that function according to different
laws then this would be an observable discontinuity and our model will be falsified by
it.
Uniformity of natural law leads to similar yet distinct.
§234
The uniformity of natural law is the sole reason that there are similar things in the
world.
§235
Two diamonds, therefore, are existentially distinct. They form in nature independently and that they are at all similar is clear testimony to the
uniformity of natural law. A diamond and a tree are existentially distinct in exactly the same way.
§236
In our model each “molecule” of water in a body of water is existentially
distinct. A body of water is a reflection not of any relation between the molecular parts but simply of
this great uniformity.
§237
Natural properties of this kind are the product of this uniformity, functionally
dependent on a construction from primitive nature but the elements of that property are
strictly independent; quantum phenomena not withstanding.10.
Relations And EpistemologyA relation is entirely the product of apprehension. Relations are ways of speaking about the world.
§239
In our model relations are solely the product of apprehension. They are ways of speaking about the world. They are present only as the result of the biophysical mechanics of sentience that we will
present.
Relations solely the product of our mechanics.
§242
Relations can be apprehended, they have epistemological status, but they do not
exist in the world beyond apprehension in the mechanics we describe.
Inventions emerge from assembly of parts.
§243
The product of invention, a television for example, emerges from the assembly of
its parts. There is clearly an identity between the apprehension of television-ness, that which
defines a television, and the apprehension of the physical assembly of a
television, what it is to be a television.
Televisions do not exist in the world beyond apprehension.
§244
Television-ness is an essential property of the apprehended assembly alone. It is not a property of the world as a whole. Television-ness has epistemological status but a television has no existential status beyond
its apprehension. A television is not actually existent in the world. The physical assembly of a television corresponds merely to an apprehensible assembly of
parts.
Experience in a different category.
§245
Properties like television-ness and experience are in distinct categories. Television-ness, in particular, is a property dependent upon the existence of experience not
only in that one has to possess experience for it to have any relevance in the world, but
also in that it is the product of conscious intelligence. A television does not exist if there is no-one to apprehend it.
Compared to properties arising from uniform laws.
§246
Television-ness is also distinct from the properties of the world that emerge from the
uniformity of natural law. What we call “fluid” and “solid” exist without our
participation in the world. In our model they have existential status in deference to their construction from primitive
nature alone. Any perceived relation is entirely the product of apprehension.
The Uniqueness of ExperienceThe distinct place of experience in the world. Fluids and solids from a uniformity in natural law.
§247
In our existential model, fluids and solids arise in the world because of a
great uniformity in natural law. They are features of the world that recur widely and this recurrence is testimony to that
great uniformity.
§248
They are not constant. In their own state they transform under the laws of nature and they may transform under those
laws from one to another, fluids become solids and vice versa.
§249
These are features that continue to play a role in the world.
Emergence suggests experience arises similarly.
§250
Emergence theorists[23] have argued that
experience may arise in nature in the same manner as fluids and solids11.
§252
For this to be true in any model experience would have to be the consequence of the
uniformity of natural law. It would have to transform to other forms and play a continuing role in the physics of the
world. Yet experience in emergence models has no such role. It is merely present, a dualism. It is a logical construction that ends with the claim “and then magic happens
here.”
Emergence theory logically inadequate.
§253
The position of emergence theory is logically inadequate and amounts to a direct appeal to magic. As Penrose suggested earlier, there is nothing in our current physical models
that leads us, logically and constructively, to experience as a property arising
from some assembly.
No transform to other forms.
§255
Unlike solids and fluids there is no transformation in emergence theory from experience to
any other form. There is no logical reduction or constructive route to experience and no role given to it. Whereas, the appearance of fluids and solids, while picturesque, is clearly not magical and
these forms continue to play a role in the physics of the world.
Experience logically distinct.
§256
Experience is a necessary distinction. And while we will argue here that the various forms of sense are in fact characterized by
forms of mass/energy, we find a clear necessary distinction for the essence from
which those senses arise and a role for it in the formation of physical
structure.
Emergence abandons the systematization of nature.
§257
A failure to consider the revision of our physical models has led emergence theorists to
suggest that “When you go to a higher level, the lower level may be
irrelevant.” The suggestion is that, by this failure of reduction within the limited materialist
construction, we abandon the rigorous systematization of nature by science and
break the natural chain of functional dependence to produce a supernatural account.
The Rise of ComplexityWhere does all the complexity of the things we call “living” come from?
§258
Consider a final example: an apple.
Apple-ness not like television-ness.
§259
Clearly an apple is not a product of intelligence, as all things in our model it
derives in a construction from primitive nature according to natural law. But apple-ness is not at all like television-ness. Nor is its form readily explained by the brute force and uniformity in physics that produces
the elements or fluid forms of them.
§260
The diversity of apples, of fruit and of all living forms, suggests that something
else is going to disrupt the great uniformity in natural law as seen in the partial
cosmology that includes fluids and solids.
§261
Where does all the complexity of “living” things manifest on this planet
come from? What brings it about? How are we to describe the mechanics that enables nature to produce the variety of sense?
Hard questions lead to acts of desperation.
§262
Frustration over hard questions like these has led emergence theorists to consider the
possibility of “and then magic happens here.” But, from our point of view, to consider such magic viable is to undermine the
principles of good science. It is an act of desperation.
False expectations by applying established ideas.
§263
Oh, we have some inductive expectation that apples are constructed in the
same way that fundamental elements are, in a continuum of increasing
complexity, but this expectation has weak foundations.
§264
We understand many of the mechanisms involved in the assembly of an apple and its
function. We know that it is a product, at least in part, of the substantive
essence, of energy/mass. We know that its form is, at least in part, the product of gravitation.
§265
However, the origin of an apple is not readily explained by our established
ideas. There is something else going on, a different kind of mechanics, that is not
evident in the formation of the elements and their solid or fluid forms. These are simply the product of nature's brute force and the uniformity of natural law. There is something more delicate and subtle going on.
The Business of ThinkingExperience and logical machines. Science relies upon assumptions about apprehension.
§266
All of science relies upon the nature of logic and apprehension. Indeed, human understanding of any kind, be it philosophic, religious, or scientific, relies upon our base assumptions of what is happening when we apprehend the world. It relies upon our assumptions about what is really going on when we sense the world.
§267
We make natural inferences, we anticipate, we predict. Those predictions are intimately bound to action, to our response. Conventions of all kinds shape the nature of this anticipation and action to form the foundation
of our individual understanding and our behavior.
§268
The foundations of logic are built upon our understanding of apprehension and what is
apprehensible. This understanding relies upon how we view the existence of experience and what we consider to be
its place in the world. This foundation is fundamental to our navigation of and survival in the world. It is the basis of any epistemology.
Experience cannot be apprehended.
§269
Yet experience itself cannot logically be apprehended. Simply, we cannot experience experience. Experience cannot be the subject of experience. We simply experience.
No role found for experience in logic.
§270
For all of this, contemporary logic, and most especially its manifestation
in computer science, has no place and no role for experience. It has reduced to nominalism12 and the mechanics of symbolic integration. It has disregarded the original foundations of logic from George Boole to Rudolf Carnap, a reduction to experience, sense.
§275
At best, due primarily to the work of Gottlob Frege, logic has accepted subjectivism, a form of dualism in which experience is an
end in itself and otherwise provides a conception of meaning that has no role in the
world.
The unfulfilled promise of logic.
§277
Our advances in the utilization of symbolic computation and our stalled consideration of the
foundations of logic have left behind an unfulfilled promise. That promise was best articulated at the birth of computer science by Charles Sanders Peirce. In 1887 he noted the opportunity that the invention of logical machines afforded.
| ❝ |
§279
Precisely how much of the business of thinking a machine could possibly be made to perform,
and what part of it must be left for the living mind, is a question not without conceivable
practical importance; the study of it can at any rate not fail to throw needed light on the
nature of the reasoning process.
§280
Though the machines of Jevons and of Marquand were designed chiefly to illustrate more
elementary points, their utility lies mainly. in the evidence they afford concerning this problem.
Charles Sanders Peirce. Logical Machines. (1887) |
§281
The machines that Peirce refers to here are the early machines, constructed mainly of wooden
mechanisms, by William Stanley Jevons and Peirce's student Allan Marquand. They utilized the first physical representations of Boole's logic13.
§283
Computing machines have certainly thrown light upon the nature of reasoning processes and they
have endowed us with productive mathematical and social tools. Yet the question of the identity of that part of thinking that must be left for the living mind
is neglected, widely considered irrelevant or the subject of fantastic invention.
The frustration of grounding logic.
§284
The opportunity that Peirce foresaw is unfulfilled and the frustration it affords in best
reflected in comments made some years later made by Rudolf Carnap and first published in 1928[24].
| ❝ |
§285
The question is this: provided that to all or some types of psychological processes there
correspond simultaneous processes in the central nervous system, what connects the processes
in question with one another? Very little has been done toward a solution to the correlation
problem of the psychophysical relation, but, even if this problem were solved (i.e., if we
could infer the characteristics of a brain process from the characteristics of a
psychological process, and vice versa), nothing would have been achieved to further the
solution of the essence problem (i.e., the psychophysical problem). For this problem is not concerned with the correlation, but with the essential relation; that
is, with that which “essentially” or “fundamentally”
leads from one process to the other or which brings forth both from a common root.
§286
...there still remain, in the main, three hypotheses: mutual influence, parallelism, and
identity in the sense of the two aspect theory.
§287
Three contradicting and unsatisfactory answers and no possibility of finding or even
imagining an empirical fact that could here make the difference: a more hopeless situation
can hardly be imagined.
Rudolf Carnap. P. 37-38,The Logical Structure of the World. (1928) |
§288
These comments reflect the frustration of our position as it continues today.
Our StoryA summary of the historical narrative.
§289
This brings us to the narrative that we will present. It concerns the distinction between two world views in mathematical logic, the
distinction between logic as the integration of the parts and logic as a differentiation
from the entirety of sense. The conflict in these world views is represented by the two most influential logicians of the
twentieth century: Rudolf Carnap, and Alan Turing.
Rudolf CarnapThe rise of positivism. Experience taken seriously before 1950.
§290
Before the 1950's the existence of experience was taken seriously by logicians and
scientists. For the mathematicians interested in questions of apprehension in the foundations of
geometry such as Henri Poincaré[25], for pragmatists influenced by Charles Sanders Peirce[26], for the logical positivists and empiricists of the renowned Vienna Circle and Berlin
Schools, and for physicists such as Ernst Mach and those later concerned with interpretations
of quantum theory, the existence of experience was a central and dominant
concern.
§292
Both positivism14 and empiricism necessarily imply a reduction to experience, though the
nature of that final reduction has never been clear.
Leaving room for new discoveries about perception.
§294
In particular, the advocacy of physicalism by logical positivists such as Rudolf Carnap rests upon a pragmatic and
fundamental understanding. It is an understanding that appeals to the scientific method and that reduced to
characterized experience, to sense. The physicalism advocated by Carnap sought a naturalistic basis and anticipated extensions to
our physical models as we made new discoveries about perception. These discoveries he anticipated would allow an explanation of experience in nature.
Carnap's physicalism is not materialist.
§296
The physicalism of Rudolf Carnap is not materialism. As noted earlier, the materialism of modern conception assumes that we have identified all the essential things of
the world.
§298
In our unqualified use of the term “physicalism” here we refer to the
physicalism of Rudolf Carnap. This we qualify as liberal physicalism and not the type physicalism of identity theory advocated by Carnap's colleague Herbert Feigl.
Verifiable and derived from natural law.
§301
Carnap took the first thesis of physicalism to be simply that claims about the world can be
confirmed by others. He rejected the idea that you can have private knowledge, gifts from God, that
cannot ultimately be shared, rigorously systematized, and confirmed. He took the second thesis of physicalism to be that the laws of nature, including those for
organisms and their behaviors, are logical consequences of natural physical laws.
“Those laws which hold in nature.”
§302
He clarified this by saying:
| ❝ |
§303
This thesis does not refer to the laws known to us at present, but to those laws which
hold in nature and which our knowledge can only more or less approximate. The thesis may therefore be understood as the hypothesis that in the future it will
become possible to an ever greater extent to derive known extra-physical laws from known
physical laws.
§304
It is true that these two theses of physicalism go far beyond the present possibility of
reducing extra-physical concepts and laws to physical ones. These do not represent firmly established knowledge but sweeping extrapolating
hypotheses.
Rudolf Carnap. P.883,The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap: The Library of Living Philosophers. (1963) |
§305
This is a view that allows for new discovery.
Carnap rejects emergence theory.
§306
He goes on to affirm my own rejection of claims in emergence theory[27]:
| ❝ |
§307
As a specific argument against the doctrine of emergentism, which has been adopted even
by some empiricists, I should like to emphasize in this context the philosophically
important fact that scientific investigations demonstrate ever more clearly a continuity
in the evolution of man. We may think, e.g., of the development of quasi-organic entities from inorganic
substances, further of viruses, one-cell organisms, higher organisms, and finally human
beings. All empiricists have abandoned the earlier belief that there is a fundamental difference,
a “difference in kind” , between man and other animals, and between
organisms and the inorganic world. Nobody denies that there are differences and that they are of very great importance both
theoretically and practically. But these differences have no sharp boundary lines: they are differences of degree within
a continuum. It is possible, of course, to draw a line by definition between human beings and other
animals; but any such line is to some extent arbitrary, that is to say, the line might
be drawn with just as good reasons somewhat later or somewhat earlier. The traditional discontinuity views had their historical source in certain magical and
religious beliefs, and these views lingered on for quite some time after the magical and
religious beliefs from which they originated had been abandoned. It seems to me that emergentism has a similar character. There is no doubt that emergentism can be formulated in a non-metaphysical, meaningful,
and scientific way. Yet I doubt that there is any good objective reason for drawing a sharp boundary at some
point and declaring: “At exactly this place and time the first sensation (or:
the first sensation of red) occurred.” Such a declaration may be justified on the basis of a psychophysical dualism, understood
not as an ontological thesis, but as a proposal for the use of a dualistic language. Although I would strongly disagree with such a dualistic emergentism, I think it is more
coherent than the non-dualistic version of emergentism which is defended by some
empiricists. Once dualism is abandoned, there seems to be no good reason for the position which
singles out the occurrence of certain new micro-structures from that of others and
declares that the former are connected with new qualities or sense-data while the later
are just new physical structures. If we could study the development from inorganic matter to man in detail, down to the
physical micro-structure of all bodies, we would find new micro-structures all the
time. Many of them show dispositions for responses of higher and higher degrees of integration
(in a vague sense not easy to explicate). If the degree of integration is sufficiently high, it is customary to speak of organic
responses (again in a vague sense). Finally, there are certain kinds of tissues customarily called nerve tissues; in
terrestrial organisms, we find all responses of a very high degree of integration to be
connected with tissues of this kind. But we do not know whether this connection holds for all higher organisms in other parts
of the universe. Hence, we do not know whether the occurrence of this kind of tissue may be taken as an
essential criterion of higher degrees of integration. In any case, the possible degrees of integration form a continuum. Therefore it would be arbitrary to draw a sharp line at one particular value of the
degree of integration and to say that from here on all of the more highly integrated
responses are accompanied by, or are themselves to be regarded as,
“mental” events, (e.g., “sensations” ) or are
“conscious” , whereas all responses of lower degree are not. Here, as in the case of the concepts of organism and of man, the discontinuity view, when
held by those who have abandoned dualism, seems to be due solely to an after affect of
the abandoned position.
Rudolf Carnap. P.883,The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap: The Library of Living Philosophers. (1963) In his response to Herbert Feigl on Physicalism. |
Carnap takes experience seriously but did not know how to proceed.
§308
It should be clear then that the physicalism expressed by Carnap reflects a monist view that
there are no fundamental divisions and a positive view that all is open to a unified
scientific explanation. Carnap takes experience seriously as existentially essential. He simply did not know how to proceed.
Alan TuringExcitement over computation and the rise of objectivism. Experience neglected after 1950.
§309
In the 1950s a ruthless and supernatural objectivism began to take hold in
which, despite the mandate of empiricism, the existential questions
surrounding experience are marginalize and eliminated from the agenda of science.
§310
This happens primarily because logical techniques, that had Carnap made significant
contributions to, provided immediate benefits that enabled the revolution in
computing devices and the economic benefits they brought with them.
The seductive success of computing devices.
§311
The advantages of the effective techniques established in the work of Alan Turing[28], Alfred Tarski[29][30], and Claude Shannon[31] seemed so powerful and so
productive that they appeared to be able to solve quite literally everything15.
§316
Alan Turing offered a useful notion of computation and took a first step toward reasoning
about intelligence without recourse to sense or experience[32]. Alfred Tarski offered a notion of truth, eliminating experience in his definitions[33]. Claude Shannon developed a mathematical theory of communication that led to the foundation of
information theory[34]. None ever found, or in Shannon's case needed, a place for experience in their
developments. And perhaps all of them are victims of subsequent over simplification and a generalization
that neglects the goals and boundaries of their original inquiry.
Turing's influence profound.
§317
Alan Turing's influence is the most profound. His broad consideration to the questions of consciousness is widely misrepresented[35].
§318
Turing's objectives are practical and more modest than are widely reported. He was challenged by the presence of experience and recognized the limits of his
proposals. He sought primarily to take clear and rigorous first steps toward understanding the problem
of the mind. He took up Peirce's vision. Unfortunately, subsequent advocates have conveniently ignored Turing's own separation of
issues and acknowledgment that questions remained unanswered.
Turing puts “consciousness” aside to enable progress.
§319
Turing felt that certain mysteries related to consciousness did not need to be explained
before the question he sought to address could be answered. That question was whether a machine could be as intelligent as you or I:
| ❝ |
§320
I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about
consciousness. There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected with any attempt to
localise it. But I do not think these mysteries necessarily need to be solved before we can answer the
question with which we are concerned in this paper.
Alan Turing. Computing Machinery and Intelligence. (1950) |
§321
We will argue that this was, in fact, a fundamental mistake that is unmitigated by
the practical success of his models. As a result, we will argue that there are fundamental limits to Turing's model of
computation.
Reclaiming ExperienceReclaiming the existential necessity of experience. Clear benefits in Turing's contribution.
§322
The central point of this narrative is that while the practical contributions of Turing and
others had clear and immediate benefits. After all they lay the ground for the technological advances of the twentieth century.
Foundational questions put aside.
§323
However, a consideration that had been of principal concern in science and
more particularly in the foundations of logic was subsequently neglected. That consideration had simply been put aside by Turing for purely practical reasons, in the
interest of more immediate progress.
§324
Unfortunately, in the sixty year period since 1950 the field of logic has
stagnated with questions at the foundations of logic that have remain neglected. The product of that neglect is systemic. Despite the flurry of interest around computer science, logic is generally
considered “a done deal” with little more to be said except in those
uninteresting (sic) quiet and unfunded corners of the foundations
of mathematics.
§325
In the past sixty years Logic has made no advance as profound as those in the previous one
hundred years since Boole. Logic proper, following Frege and Lewis not Peirce or Carnap, has mostly
(as far as I can tell) resolved to a subjectivist philosophy of intension. One that makes no difference in the world beyond its change to sense. And with no conception of how such a difference relates to action.
§327
Before 1950 science took the existential questions surrounding experience seriously. Led by people like Rudolf Carnap of the Vienna Circle and its advocacy of a logical
positivism, the sentences of science were viewed as marks describing structure
and behavior that can be verified by an individual's experience of the world.
Evolving from strict solipsism.
§328
This strict solipsism, the view that one's own sense is all that can ultimately be
relied upon, was later rejected. It was not rejected because solipsism is fundamentally wrong but simply because logical
inference is more powerful than at first considered.
§329
Intuitive inference arising from genetic disposition, inductive inference arising from what we have sensed before, and deductive inference arising from rigorous and systematic methods allow us to expand beyond a dependence on direct experience. To discover new truths from the truths we apprehended before.
§330
We will show that there is nothing magical about prediction, inference in all its
forms is a natural product of the mechanics we propose.
The existence of experience warrants explanation.
§331
The techniques of Shannon, Tarski, and Turing in logic and computation has proved useful. They have allowed us to apply effective techniques of thinking in mechanized symbolic
systems. But we have become over excited by our success and this usefulness has distracted us from the
fundamental issue. We appear to have forgotten that empiricism fundamentally relies upon the existence of
experience and that existence warrants explanation.
An inconvenient and embarrassing fact for logic.
§332
For a generation of logicians and physicists the existential challenge of experience has
become an inconvenient and embarrassing fact. It is manifest to all of us. Yet it is difficult to deal with or to identify any role that it may play.
The expectations in AI cannot be met.
§333
Contemporary optimism, in the practice of Artificial Intelligence for example, is founded
upon the premise that our physical models are complete. These expectations, based on the premises of emergence already discussed, cannot be met for
reasons that are fundamental to the world.
There is no imminent “singularity.”
§334
The technological “singularity” of Ray Kurzweil is merely a technologist's fantasy[36]. There is no imminent artificial intelligence comparable to the capabilities of our
species. And this is quite simply because this intelligence is not merely heuristics or
self-reference. There is something fundamental to cognition and recognition that is unaccounted for in this
work. Human-level intelligence requires that we first understand the basis of intelligence: the deeply connected mechanisms of sense and motility in biology.
Experience must play a role in the formation of the world.
§336
We appear to have missed the obvious and simple fact that an explanation of the existence of
experience requires that we identify a role for experience in the formation of the world. There must be a role for the essence of experience in the formation of organisms in general
and senses in particular. For if we cannot identify such a role then it is simply beyond scientific explanation and the
matter here can never be resolved.
§337
This is a position we stubbornly refuse to accept.
The ApproachOur method of attack, including and informal discussion and summary of the formal
approach. A Constructive ApproachAn essential statement of our approach. Our goal is a new formal mechanics.
§338
Our approach to the explanation of the world is constructive. Our goal is to formalize this logical construction in a calculus, a new
mechanics, that allows us to reason about structures and its behavior.
A previously unconsidered atomic distinction.
§339
Unlike earlier constructions ours includes an atomic distinction, one that is a
necessary aspect of primitive nature. This “primitive of experience” allows us to include in our construction all
sensory and motile structures and to reason about their behavior.
Observation and isolation of necessary distinctions.
§340
We develop a model of the world inductively by starting from the observation of the necessary
distinctions that the world forces upon us and distinguishing them from simple ways of speaking
about the world.
§341
We then identify the components and elements of these distinctions. We undertake this identification by intuitively inferring first principles. Among these are the assumptions that:
- The laws of nature are everywhere uniform.
- When reductions fail, by evidence or contradiction, it is the premises of our
logical construction that must be reviewed, such reductions cannot lead to
supernatural conclusions.
- The world is a construction from primitive nature and while primitive nature itself may not
be immediately accessible the essential aspects of primitive nature present themselves.
Three atomic distinctions.
§342
Of primitive nature we can apprehend three covariant aspects: energy/mass, gravitation and the primitive that we propose we take to be the three atomic
distinctions of our model. They are the accessible essential aspects of primitive nature in which they are unified.
§343
We then proceed in a logical manner to explore the implications of those principles and use them
to predict the formation and operation of motile physiological structures that embody sense and
ultimately “the mind.”
And reasoning about group behavior.
§344
Finally, with this thorough understanding of individuals we consider the behavior
of such individual structures in groups.
Our approach is mathematical.
§345
Essentially our approach is a logical construction of the world consistent with traditional logic
and mathematics with one important exception. The subject of our inquiry includes the existential nature of experience and apprehension of the
world that it enables.
In line with Carnap and Peirce.
§346
This approach is compatible with the objectives of the liberal physicalism and constructive epistemology advocated by Rudolf Carnap and presented in his work
“The Logical Structure of the World” (known widely as the
“Aufbau” 16) published in 1928, and the subsequent work published in 1938 of Hans Reichenbach in “Experience and Prediction.”[37] Though we will develop a manifest affinity with the work of Rudolf Carnap and the earlier
semeiotic work of Charles Sanders Peirce.
Our ConstructionThe constructive characterization we propose.
§350
This approach provides the foundation of three models that describe the construction of the world
from primitive nature.
§351
The first model is one of general sense and motility.
§352
In this model we characterize the construction of sense and motility in organisms. We explain the physical engineering of sentience, how sentient entities come
into existence and senses evolve.
§353
The second model is one of semeiosis.
§354
In this model we characterize the higher-order processes that process the content of
experience and produce behavior. It can be viewed as the operation of individuals.
§355
The third model enables reasoning about behavior in social networks.
§356
This model enables the characterization of behavior of individuals in groups. The model provided is simple: in it social behavior is the product of genetic disposition mitigated by convention.
A single coherent view of nature.
§357
We seek to provide a single coherent view of nature in which our species arises and in which all
can eventually be apprehended by minds that may themselves eventually be within our power to
artificially construct.
Developing the Formal ModelHow we will develop of the theory. Building a mathematical foundation.
§358
In the core of this work we use the presence of the primitive aspect of nature that we propose as
the basis of a formal explanation. We develop a new mechanics in the form a calculus that describes the physical structures
associated with sense and motility.
An experimental geometry.
§359
Our initial direction, the one that we will present here, uses an experimental
geometry that excludes traditional conceptions that relate to apprehension. We do this because intuitively a calculus of apprehension will ultimately be limited by such
assumptions.
Eliminates orthogonality.
§360
In particular, we eliminate unlimited orthogonality for the reasons we discussed
earlier. We argue that perpendicular orthogonality is not a necessary distinction but simply a way of
speaking about the world. Our intuitions concerning it are founded in received authority. It is one of the first geometric notions that we are taught.
The continuity of experience.
§361
To explain the continuity of experience in our model, and encouraged by our rejection of
unlimited orthogonality, we also eliminate time.
§362
This is consistent with General Relativity[38]. Spacetime is not a necessary distinction; it is a way of speaking about the
world. The world does not force the concept of spacetime upon us, we force it upon the
world.
Differential transformations without time.
§363
Transformations in our model then are solely the product of energy in the transforming
structure. Our differential calculus therefore is modified to accommodate both the new coordinate system and
the mass/energy in a structure.
§364
With this new geometry we assemble a new analytic algebra that can express structures and their
behavior.
Unification of geometry and logic.
§365
Given the nature of this new algebra, it must ultimately describe the physiological
structures that embody logical operations, it should ultimately unify geometry and
logic.
§366
If successful this formalism will provide a mathematical foundation for the physical engineering
of sentience. This will, in turn, provide the basis of an operational model of individuals and the
basis for reasoning about the behavior of those individuals in groups.
GR precedence for formal approach.
§367
We use as a precedence for our formal approach the description of the gravitational field as a
primitive aspect of the world in the general theory of relativity. Like the gravitational field the effect of the new primitive is covariant with the behavior of
mass/energy.
§368
Let us not misunderstand covariance as something that simply takes us back to identity theory. The solution is mutually affective, in which one primitive aspect of the world shapes
the other.
Finding a convenient characterization.
§369
The formal characterization of the primitive then must play a role similar to the role played by
gravitation in the curvature of spacetime described by General Relativity.
§370
Simplicity is our goal. However, we should note that Einstein was very lucky. The curvature of spacetime is stunningly convenient.
§371
Are we ignoring Quantum Mechanics? Well, not exactly.
§372
It should be clear that to achieve our goal, given our premise of a universal
primitive, it is impossible to construct a model of sentience if we begin with
particles. As we have noted earlier, quantum theory deals with the past and the future and
has nothing to say of the present.
§373
Our new mechanics is all about “the present.”
§374
Quantum Mechanics is viewed by us, in general, as a matter of record since the entire
nature of particles is the product of record.
Considering the photoelectric effect.
§375
Where does that leave us with phenomena like the photoelectric effect?
§376
We have no doubt that there are quantum effects and that Planck's quantum of action is a
convenient and useful tool for the characterization of mass/energy. As is often noted, the Standard Model is very successful.
§377
We acknowledge these effects, for example, where natural constrains of physical
structure produce quantum behavior and it may indeed be the case that Planck's constant is a
necessary minimum of such measures. But any particle physics, in our model, is necessarily explained as a record of
differentiation in field physics, a product of apprehension. It is a record in which we, effectively, push an event from the present into the
record of events.
§378
As a result particle physics can only ever deal with particles, records of events in
the world. This suggests a semeiotic problem, a problem of
apprehension; since, by this view, gravitation is
inaccessible to particle theory or any attempt to model it through particle
physics. We have here again the problem of the strong locality of logical integration through the notion
of particles versus a non-local differentiation, the effect of
gravity.
§379
To be clear, our model requires a view the is neither the classical continuum nor
atomic. However, it is more like conceptions of the continuum and, for us, a
length is indeed continuous. However, there is no “flow of time” in our model. Mass/energy, gravitation, and the primitive we propose are mutually effective covariant features of a continuous field that is primitive
nature.
§380
There are no particles and there are no waves. Waves are also a matter of record, the record of fluctuations in the states of
primitive nature. Primitive nature is eternal and constant in the variety of states that include the origins of the
observable universe and every other state “before” and
“after.”
§381
There is only what we will call “the eternal moment” in which all transformations are the product of energy within the structures that
exist. Our notions of the past and the future are simply ways of speaking about events. Events, states of primitive nature, and records of events are the necessary
distinctions.
§383
This approach is essential to our explanation of the continuity of experience.
§384
The uniformity of natural law plays a central role in our model. It is the basis of our construction of existence. This view of strong uniformity requires that all the aspects of primitive nature are of the same
type. It would not permit, for example, a quantum theory in which particles
existed, in which the world is atomic. For our model to be consistent mass/energy has to be a universal primitive aspect of the world
like the primitive we propose and like gravitation. The structure of the world is simply a differentiation from the whole.
No time to reinvent the whole of physics.
§385
Our primary goal is not to reinvent all of physics. We seek only to formulate a set of equations that accurately predicts the formation of
biophysical structures and the behavior of mass/energy that results from the presence of the
primitive we have proposed. These equations need to describe the mechanisms of sense and motility.
§386
But clearly if our model is to hold the methods and techniques we use are validated by their
application to traditional questions in physics. The formalism should, for example, be able to express General Relativity.
§387
However, as a practical matter we make no accommodation for this fact. We make no promise that our approach will be convenient for the expression of other physical
phenomena.
Physically Engineering SentienceOur approach to the physical engineering involved.
§388
In this section we provide a brief summary of the semeiotic model and our approach to the
physical engineering of sense and motility. A summary of our formal approach is given in a following section.
§389
An impression is the physical trace of a mark, the subject of a sign, upon the sentient form, against the primitive we propose.
§390
We use the notion “against” here in the same way that we may speak of
constructing a shelter against a wall or consider how the structure of mass/energy is affected
when assembled “against” the gravitational field.
Characterization by form.
§391
There exists an inert presence, the basis of experience, such that, when
mass/energy is assembled against it, provide the covariant physical characterization
of sense; and a characteristic action potential.
Sensory and motile manifolds.
§392
We develop formally the topological notion of a sensory manifold that is an element of the
physical structure that characterizes sense and motile behavior.
§393
In this geometry we use a novel finite coordinate system that is not cartesian in
nature, it eliminates the conventional notion of the unlimited orthogonal by
removing the associated constraint while still enabling the expression of unique
relative points. Instead of an unlimited dimensional geometry that starts with “point,” “line,” “plane” we begin with “length” and derive “plane” and
“point” as necessary distinctions.
Eliminating ungrounded assumptions.
§394
This novel approach to specifying biophysical manifolds is experimental but has certain
advantages. We recognize that the approach will be validated only if it finds more general use. This approach to the inquiry, however, ensures that we are not misled by the
ungrounded premises concerning apprehension in existing geometric models.
Characterizing cellular and membrane architecture.
§395
A set of such manifolds can be considered to represent the cells and membranes of an organism.
§396
Our formal development also aims to capture the thermodynamic and genetic behavior involved in
the hierarchical structure of these dynamic sensory systems. Sensory manifolds are not static or uniform structures. They carry a variety of properties that can be described as surface functions and stimulate
translations or deformations of the sensory manifold.
The properties of our primitive.
§397
Sensory manifolds rely upon the presence of the primitive we propose that has the following
properties:
- The primitive provides a non-local affect17 against which physical structure can produce a sensory manifold.
- The nonlocal affect is across the collection of sensory manifolds corresponding to the
physical structure and characterized sense of an individual.
- A differentiated experience (a sign) corresponds to one or more
states of the individual's sensory manifolds.
- Such differentiations are from the entirety of sense.
- The natural selection of sensory manifolds, and the consequent evolution of metabolism and
genetic machinery, is a result of covariance between states of the sensory manifold and
motile responses that do not diminish the organism's survival or are mutations that provide
benefits in the changing environment.
- A particular conformance of a sensory manifold corresponds to a particular sense. This provides the basis of memory.
- Sensory manifolds of similar conformance correspond to senses of similarly18.
§401
A recollection of similarity increases associated action potentials. The conformance that provides a complete recognition state produces action. Physical circumstances that compel an action in the organism produce actions that have
the highest potential and, at least momentarily, the manifolds conform to the
highest potential recognition state.
§402
Translations of these sensory manifolds represent the operation of the organism.
The same mechanics throughout.
§403
For simplicity we assume that the entire organism is engineered according to the same
mechanics. Hence, sensory characterizations and related motile responses covary in form and
focus according to genetic disposition, the genetically constructed organism provides
an a priori link between sense and motile response.
§404
Once an impression has been formed in the physical structure of the entity it will
recollect that mark when it is reformed or recollect a similarity when it
is partially reformed. Such reformations take place when a mark is again encountered, when similar marks are
encountered, or when the impression is independently reformed in the operation of the
organism. This is how and why analogy works in our species.
§405
A recollection of similarity increases action potentials that are associated with the producing
conformance. Actions are finally executed when there is a complete recognition state, a state
imprinted upon the organism by previous experience or its natural structure. If the organism is in a circumstance in which action is required by other sensory subsystems then
the organism will perform the action with the highest action potential and briefly the manifolds
conform to those recognition states.
Physical properties required.
§406
This functionality in complex organisms requires certain physical properties that have been
previously noted.
§407
There necessarily exists a certain nonlocality manifest in sense and hence in the
physical operations of the sensory manifold.
§408
An impression is an imprint upon a distributed motile physiology. The impression upon the organism coexists with all other impressions to produce the
entire embodiment of sense.
§409
There is a physical transformation across the physiology that produces motility.
§410
A physical transformation amplifies by conformance spread, chemotaxis, and other motile functions to provide a richer characterization of sense and produce a larger coordinated
motile response.
§411
Characterized sense is directed toward the individuated organism structure.
§412
This individuation is the reason that I do not feel what you feel; despite the
universal nature of the underlying primitive.
§413
The conditions of the impression are reproducible.
§414
That is, a particular biological morphology corresponds to a particular
memory, when reformed, the sense of it is again manifest. A reproduced impression is familiar to the organism.
An essential component of the physical substrate.
§415
The primitive we propose is thus an essential component of the physical substrate and responsible
for the engineering of sentience. This same mechanism instantiates complexity and is subjected to the principles of natural
selection because its forms may provide survival advantage.
§416
It is important to note that no computational system can replicate this engineering. For the reasons we have discussed it is not computable by current implementations of logic and it
provides an economy of engineering that is simpler and more powerful.
Logical positivism a compatible view.
§417
However, the apprehension of existing logic can be interpreted in a manner that is compatible with this new
model and such an interpretation would be compatible with the view of Rudolf Carnap, in
particular, and the logical positivists in general. But this is not the interpretation of logic in the Turing mode that makes reductions highly
localized.
Our model leads to “the familiar mind.”
§419
To summarize, we suggest that the primitive aspect of nature we propose enables
an economy of engineering not present in Alan Turing's model of computation. We introduce a necessary nonlocality in physical structure associated with this engineering that
enables the non-local coordination of physical behavior. We propose that a physical structure, a manifold of sense, against this primitive
embodies the representation of states in the world relevant to the organism and that this
physical structure is evolved by natural selection in an association with the motile responses
that it evokes. And further, that these simple mechanisms lead inevitably to the assembly of what
is familiar to you and I as “the mind.”
A Methodological Solipsism The systematic and rigorous inquiry into our experience of the world.
§420
We identify “sense” as the physical structure characterizing a primitive
aspect of the world, introduced by us here, and give a role to this natural
characterization, the formation of sense, in the development of all
complexity.
Transcendence of natural principles.
§421
Our model allows transcendence to be described constructively and maintain functional dependence
while truly being “the sum that is more than the parts.” For us, natural selection is such a transcendent principle of the
world; we refer to it here because it is a principle that should be familiar to
all.
§422
Principles are posterior determinants, a latent potential in the world described by
our model. Each are formed by and are subject to exactly the same mechanics. They are functionally dependent upon these mechanics and they play a role in the behavior of the
world. Without these mechanics they do not exist.
§423
In these terms our view is not exceptional; there is nothing that does not derive from
primitive nature yet transcendence exists in the arising principles of the
world. These are the force of “sums that are greater than the whole.” They arise from the uniformity of natural law and they are entirely unexpected.
Anticipation of principles.
§424
Principles are a surprise to any first creator 19.
§427
Anticipation itself derives from and is characterized by our mechanics. Anticipating structures are the inevitable product of our mechanics and cannot exist before
them. It is therefore meaningless to apply intuitions about anticipation in the world before this. In particular, it is meaningless to ask why gravitation and the primitive we
propose exist if these primitive aspects of the world have no immediate effect.
§428
Some principles will surprise you. Empathy, the ability of an organism to apprehend the predicament of another and to modify
their behavior accordingly, is such a principle. It is less broad than natural selection, arising solely from the mechanics of sense
and motility. It is the product of apprehension and the drive toward richer experience fashioned by natural
selection. It is a principle of the same kind as natural selection although it obviously is a principle that
specifically involves experience.
Intelligence as a principle.
§429
Intelligent behavior is also a principle manifest in the mechanics of sense and motility. By its means organisms, through an understanding of their experience, develop
effective methods for dealing with the world. The pinnacle of these methods is attempted in the discipline of logic.
§430
In undertaking this inquiry we have asked a simple question: what would be required to enable a formal explanation of experience?
§431
We begin with the assumption that not only is the formal explanation of behaviors involving
experience desirable but that it is both scientifically necessary and logically possible. Simply put, this approach is born of a stubborn refusal to accept that an
explanation of the psychophysical, mind/body, problem is beyond science.
§432
We then set about the task of identifying the necessary and sufficient basis for such a
formalization such that it describes the biophysical models that engineer sentience and is
compatible with known thermodynamics[39].
Comparing our construction to Carnap's.
§433
The principal distinction then between our approach to logical construction and the one proposed
by Carnap is that we provide the natural basis that Carnap could not identify. We are not concerned with epistemology alone but with existential questions also. We extend physical models to include a necessary primitive basis of experience. This primitive aspect is given a role in the physical assembly and mechanics of the world not
found in earlier work.
A methodological solipsism.
§434
We think that Carnap would approve. The basis of his epistemology he described as a methodological solipsism, a systematic and rigorous inquiry into our experience, and our work derives from
such an intellectual approach. In our terms he asserted that the differentiation of characterized experience is the basis of all
apprehension. The entire embodied characterization of experience has epistemic primacy. It is derived by differentiation from the entirety of sense and not assembled from the logical
parts.
§435
Our approach is also solipsist in the sense that it is the product of inferences from
experience characterized by physical structures in an individual. We extend this view of epistemology first to a general model of sentience that applies to all
species and then further generalize the notion so that the term knowledge can be defined simply as that which determines subsequent action.
The mechanics of the mind can be identified.
§437
We take one further step and assert that the mechanisms of apprehension are observable in the
dynamic structures of the physical engineering that we propose. In particular this implies that the physical mechanisms of the familiar mind can be
identified.
The same existential status.
§438
We give an constructive existential account of this new mechanics and eliminate any separation of
epistemology. As a result our final epistemology is not anthropic; anthropic knowledge is simply a
subset of a more generalized notion.
§439
Our conception of knowledge is intrinsic to our view of how the world is constructed and
traditional metaphysics is eliminated20.
Similarities to Maturana and Valera.
§441
This approach to knowledge, our generalized conception of it, is similar to that
proposed by Francisco Valera and Humberto Maturana. This and the associated definition of “information” as that which contributes to knowledge and identifies cause, in-formation,
are points of conceptual intersection with the work of Valera and Maturana on
autopoiesis[40]. However, unlike Maturana and Valera we reject emergent explanations of
experience.
A summary of methodology.
§445
Our methodology relies upon a construction from primitive nature, the simple composition of nature's primitive aspects, and the natural laws and principles that evolve structure. This is undertaken by a methodological solipsism, a rigorous and systematic inquiry in
which the existential nature of our experience is primary. It focuses upon and extends constructively through the assembly of organisms, sense and motile structures, to the behaviors of individuals.
§446
Such a method illustrates how physical assemblies in a world otherwise constructed by classical
mechanics eventually form to characterize sense and assemble into the range of forms that are
familiar to us. These are the forms that we call “complex” or “living” and
they manifest behaviors that transcend their substantive basis without loosing their functional
dependence. Such principles are generally covariant.
On Formal LanguageOn syntax and meaning.
§447
We adopt Rudolf Carnap's definition of a formal language[41].
| ❝ |
§448
A theory, a rule, a definition or the like is to be called “formal” when no reference is made in
it either to the meaning of the symbols, or to the sense of the expressions, but
simply and solely to the kinds and order of the symbols from which the expressions are
constructed.
Rudolf Carnap. Second Paragraph of the Introduction,The Logical Syntax of Language. (1934) |
§449
In other words, it is our goal to provide a syntactic framework that captures the
variety of constructions and behaviors we propose and, independent of any intermediate
interpretation, provide semantic rules that enable a rigorous systematization in our
model.
A definition of “meaning.”
§450
We shall utilize a precise and pragmatic definition of the term “meaning.” Meaning is exactly the behavior that is the product of the mechanisms of apprehension
according to our model.
§452
So that if one is to ask the meaning of a particular syntax it is exactly the behavior it
produces as the produce of its apprehension. We may now speak distinctly of the behavior a sign produces in the organism that constructed the
mark, should there be one, that is the subject of the sign. We can also speak of the behavior produced in others by marks that we create.
§453
A brief clarification of this definition will be helpful.
§454
Consider a computer program written by an individual of our species. What is the meaning of the program?
Similarity of apprehender required.
§455
Clearly, the behavior of the machine executing the program is not the behavior of
the programmer; even if the abstract behavior observed by a third party is
similar, for example “turn left.” It should thus be clear that any consistency of meaning relies upon the similarity of the
apprehender.
Same meaning to machines of the same type.
§456
A computer program “means” precisely the same thing to two machines of the
same type and it means precisely the same thing to two computer programmers of the same type. If the machines are not the same, let us say that the two machines utilize different
instruction sets or programming languages, then it may be said that the meaning of the
computer program differs to each machine.
§457
Similarly, if two programmers are not the same, one understanding one
language and the other another, then it may be said that the meaning differs to each
programmer.
The same program has different meanings.
§458
In each case, whether apprehended by a member of our species or a machine, unless
their exists a similarity in structure, including embodied conventions, the
apprehension of the computer program produces differing behavior, and hence has a
different meaning to each.
§459
It's worth noting, of course, that obvious physical differences can be mitigated
pragmatically if the same conventions are adopted and translated into an abstract behavior. So that while the same exact behavior is not present the desired result is produced. Hence if both organism and machine are able to apprehend the instruction “turn
left” and convert it into a behavior they may, indeed, both turn
left.
§460
Such behavior is an act of translation in semeiosis with the instruction producing different
meanings that have the same overall effect. If a translation behavior is required on apprehension then the act of translation is the
meaning.
§461
In addition, there is, in fact, some similarity between programming
languages and computer programmers. The languages of certain classes have similar syntactic constructs, are generally
written in structured English according to well known logical conventions. Programmers also have a similar capacity to reason endowed by the similarity in their physical
structure.
§462
So it will be the case that with some effort the programmer that is unfamiliar with the language
of the computer program may be able to apprehend some meaning from it. They will discover the intended meaning, and recognize the nature of the machine
required to execute it, as their reasoning makes their internal sentient structures
similar to those of the author of the program.
§463
To this end the programmer is, in effect, self modifying. They can increase their degree of similarity with the original author of the
program, sufficient to apprehend the meaning21.
Computers have limited capacity to change structure.
§465
Contemporary computers have a limited capacity to do this modification of physical structure. To the degree that changes in silicon memory is a modification of physical structure two
machines of similar type are more similar when their memory contains the same physical
patterns. But it is worth noting that this is insufficient, two machines with precisely the same
memory patterns can be entirely different executions if the way those patterns are processed
is dissimilar.
The example reflects the world.
§466
These circumstances reflect the situation in the world and it enables us to appreciate the
definition of meaning that we will use.
Meaning a function of apprehender.
§467
The central point to remember is that meaning is a function of apprehension. There is no static meaning in the world beyond the individual apprehension of
signs, individuated experiences.
Consensus a function of similarity.
§468
Consensus is a function of the degree of similarity between us as apprehending entities and
meaning is exactly the behavior produced by a sign. When we speak of “understanding” it is this similarity to which we refer.
We rely on your similarity to us to be understood.
§469
A formal language is simply a convention. Such languages rely upon the model described here to be uniformly understood; a
similarity in physical embodiment. And, as we have seen, translation can bring about the same overall effect while
apprehending different meaning.
Proving the CaseHow we propose to overcome objections.
§470
Our ultimate goal here is the development of mathematical model and a calculus that enables
particular predictions concerning the structure of physiology.
Finding simplicity despite complexity.
§471
However, the ability to make such predictions is complicated by the fact that all
the natural forces play a role in the evolutionary formation of higher-order physiological
structures. In other words, the other forces of nature introduce further complexity as their effects are able
to have greater influence due to the scale of the unfolding world.
Earliest verification in simple organisms.
§472
We anticipate therefore that the earliest verification of the theory will come from predictions
concerning the simplest and most primitive organisms in which these larger effects are minimized
and we take some time to examine the molecular models of bacteria.
Setting expectations correctly.
§473
Let us set expectations correctly. At the time of writing while we can make general predictions of the kind given in the
foregoing, the precise identification of a particular prediction is not
available.
§474
By particular prediction we mean that we have not identified something as compelling as
a perturbation in the orbit of Mercury that can be explained by the theory. Although it is worth observing that we currently having nothing as sophisticated as Newtonian
theory in the biological realm that would enable the modeling of such a perturbation in the
first place.
§475
We do suggest that conformance spread of bacterial receptors, chemotaxis and other motility, place-neurons, neuro-plasticity in general, the non-local synchronization of neural behavior, and the role of and behavior of membrane traversing fluid molecules such as nitric
oxide are particular behaviors that may be explained.
§476
The how of these mechanisms is becoming clear in the literature and we may be able to offer an
explanation of why they occur and indicate exactly what it is they are doing.
§477
We make such suggestions cautiously. The predictions made currently are rather more general conjectures. They concern the instantiation of complexity in general, sense, physiological structure and motile behavior, and the mechanisms of recognition and differentiation.
§478
Our physical proposal is tentative until, in particular, evidence for the economy of
engineering in biophysics that we predict is confirmed. We are convinced that other models involving the primitive are conceivable. We have followed intuitively the natural consequence as it appears to us.
Strong arguments none-the-less.
§479
We do present what we consider to be a strong argument for the logical necessity of a universal
primitive by rejecting the magic of contemporary emergence theory and appealing to a mutually
affective covariant construction of primitive aspects of nature22; but we are not yet at our goal of producing a theory with the robustness of Newton's
calculus or Einstein's field equations. And this must be our goal.
Enough to explore model with vigor.
§481
We do contend that an informal interpretation of the available evidence and the missing gaps in
other theories provides a good intuitive basis for exploring our theory with vigor.
§482
Given these challenges we also propose to prove our case constructively, through the
direct application of the theory to new technologies.
§483
Similarly, if this proof-in-practice is applied to competing solutions then these results are
interesting for the limits they reveal[42].
§484
The development of artificial cellular technologies are also likely to be critical to our
endeavour. So that engineering based on computational models may also serve to reveal the limits of this
engineering and illustrate how the engineering we propose contributes[43].
§485
Clearly our model predicts the engineering described by computational simulations and the
fabrication of cells based upon those simulations is incomplete.
Devices perform recognition.
§486
If our proposals are valid then we will be able to develop technology able to solve problems that
have proven intractable or impossible in the engineering sciences. These are essentially the problems of recognition and motility and they lie at the convergence of
semiconductors and biological systems. The nature of such devices is already suggested by our comments in these introductory remarks.
Tractable methods of proof available.
§487
These methods of proof provide us with a significant advantage and may provide a shorter route to
verification than is otherwise available.
The ImplicationsWhat it all means. A Summary of ContributionsA summary of fields to which the work contributes.
§488
The principal contribution of this work lies in the provision of an explanation of experience in
nature and the identification of the role that the basis of experience plays in the development
of physical structures. No other theory of sentience, of which we are aware, has this property and the
implications of the existence of such a theory are broad.
No role for experience implies no scientific explanation.
§489
If our model is false, if the physical engineering of sentience does rely upon a materialism
of conventional mechanics alone, then there is no role for experience in the formation
of physical structure. This would be a disappointing but useful result and it would illustrate that experience is beyond
scientific explanation as currently conceived. In any case then the exploration of the theory has merit, the validation or
elimination of the theory provides a valuable contribution to the natural
sciences.
Validation offers significant benefits.
§490
However, validation offers significant benefits. We offer an explanation of how physics and biology are interrelated in the instance and expansion
of complexity. We provide an explanation of the origin of all complexity. Thus we illustrate how physics and biology form a natural continuum.
§491
These contributions unify science and expand evolutionary theory by providing a role for
experience in the process of evolution and in the mechanics of natural selection.
Our model informs biophysics and medicine.
§492
Our models inform neuroscience and molecular biology. They contribute explanation to the record of observations in neurological and other biological
physical structures. By this contribution we inform medicine, adding an explanation to sensory dysfunction and the
effects of drugs and pathogens upon the senses.
Contributions to computer science.
§493
There are contributions here also to computer science and related machine engineering. These contributions are two fold.
A negative result for computer science and robotics.
§494
The first are observations that relate to the limits of computation that account for the failure
of purely computational approaches by the Turing model in applications that involve sensory
modalities. Our models explain why existing approaches to artificial-intelligence and artificial-life have
produced only limited results and why image and speech recognition that mimics the capacity of
our species has proved to be intractable.
§495
There is an associated implication that the motile responses, ubiquitous in
biology, cannot be emulated by purely computational responses. This would extend the negative result here to robotics.
Enabling machines-that-experience.
§496
The second of these contributions is the positive flip-side of these negative results. It relates to the introduction of sentience engineering, the creation of machines-that-experience
and motile materials. These are machines that apply the mechanics we propose.
§497
The machines we envision initially are not like the machines envisioned by many contemporary
advocates of machine intelligence. We do not expect our designs to suddenly awaken and magically manifest experience because of
their degree of complexity.
Simple sensors and motile materials.
§498
These machines are the product of sentience engineering and are sentient from the beginning. This allows us to consider a generation of simple sensors and motile materials before we approach
the loftier goals of intelligence at the level of our species.
§499
A good example of these simple machines will be motile materials able to sense and respond to a
variety of stresses. Imagine a suspension system, for example, for a vehicle that is able to not only
provide a smoother ride but that is also able to react to sudden changes during a collision or
perhaps able to avoid collisions by more immediate sense and response.
Contributions to epistemology and logic.
§500
There are certainly contributions here to the foundations of logic and epistemology though much
that we have done here in this regard is to affirm the intuitions of logical positivism. These contributions include insights into apprehension and proof. Among the philosophers of science that have contributed to these lines of thought we believe that
we have especially confirmed the intuitions of Rudolf Carnap and Charles Sanders Peirce.
§501
We provide a clear model illustrating the existential basis of our epistemology and we also show
that there are things that have epistemological status but no existential status beyond
apprehension.
Contributions to mathematics.
§502
We like to believe also that there are contributions here that elucidate issues in the
foundations of mathematics, especially in geometry and logic. And although not mentioned in these introductory remarks we also believe that there are related
contributions to number theory.
Contributions to physics.
§503
Of necessity, given the physical and foundational nature of our inquiry, we discuss
the nature of space and time, the continuum, and atomicity in the semeiotic context of our inquiry and in terms of the physical mechanics we
propose. These discussions are contributions to both physical sciences and the foundations of
mathematics. They illustrate how a more detailed consideration of apprehension and the mechanics of sentience
can be integrated into these disciplines.
Taking Experience SeriouslyThe proposal has broad explanatory power. The proposed primitive is novel.
§504
We have restated our proposal several times but let us for a moment call to your attention its
novelty. We do this here because we have discovered that no matter how clearly it is stated readers can
make erroneous associations.
§505
Let us make it clear first that the proposed primitive does nothing. It is not intelligent in any sense.
It is not “the Tao” or any other prior notion.
§506
One might be tempted to associate it with Taoist conceptions of the “Tao” or
the universal forces of any number of religions. It is like nothing that Lao Tzu or George Lucas conceived. It is not like “the force” in Star Wars. An appreciation of it is not going to endow you with special powers expect by those inventions
that the application of your intellect to it may apply to it.
It is like its sibling, gravitation.
§507
If it is like anything, it is like its sibling, gravitation. It is a feature of the world and because it exists in the world the
sibling, mass/energy, assembles around it in covariant forms of sense and
motility. Just as it assembles around gravitation.
§508
The introduction of this simple primitive enables a model with broad explanatory powers. It provides solutions to problems that have long puzzled existential thinkers. In particular, it solves the so-called mind/body problem. It provides an account of the origins of life and a role for experience in evolutionary
theory. It offers an explanation of the evolution of senses and the manner by which motile physiology is
engineered.
§509
By providing an explanation for the continuity of experience it also contributes answers to
ancient questions concerning the continuum and the nature of time.
A Role for Experience in NatureThe proposal provides a role for experience in nature.
§510
In this section we underscore the importance of providing a role for experience in nature and
accepting this as a necessary implication of a rejection of dualism.
§511
Our proposal has a substantive basis and extends earlier physicalist thinking by introducing a
necessary and sufficient extension to existing physical models.
§512
We view the physical construction of senses and the familiar mind as an engineering by natural
selection of motile sentient physiological structures against the primitive we propose. This
provides a role for the characterization of sense in the physical assembly of organisms.
Providing survival advantage.
§513
Simply put, physical forms that produce characterizations of this primitive can
provide survival advantage. Senses evolve for the richer characterization of experience in conjunction with the motile
responses to which they are immediately related. This evolution by natural selection provides survival advantages to organisms in their
environment. The rest follows.
An economy of engineering.
§514
There is an economy of engineering in recognition and motile response. Our proposal eliminates across system interaction latencies and integrative functions in
computational models and replaces these mechanisms with the mechanics of biophysical
differentiation, a reduction from the whole, against the primitive we propose. This provides an effective nonlocal synchronization in biophysical structures.
§515
This economy constrains computational complexity in precisely the same manner are computational
complexity is constrained by gravitation; except that the product of this constraint is
sense and motility.
Three primitive aspects of nature.
§516
We construct our model of the world on the basis of three evident aspects of primitive nature:
mass/energy, shaped by the evident affects of gravity and the proposed primitive of
experience.
§517
For comparison and clarity, the new primitive we propose is inert. Its affect is not a force as one considers electromagnetism a force it is a feature of the
world. And, by analogy only, we describe it as inert and present in the same way
that the affect of gravity is inert and present in General Relativity.
A convenient characterization.
§518
Gravity can be conveniently characterized as a curvature of spacetime in the presence of mass. We seek a similarly convenient characterization of the engineering of sentience that
characterizes sense.
Not available to known mechanics.
§519
So that we may move beyond identity theories and make predictions that enable the presence of the
primitive to be empirically identified it is clearly insufficient to develop a model that can be
explained by or corresponds with known mechanics. For our conjecture to hold, the primitive must enable a capability that is otherwise impossible
and remain formally describable.
Sense and motility, the same engineering.
§520
In our model familiar high-order experiences are covariant with motile physiology. Sense is characterized by the motion and form of physiology. Motility and sense are two aspects of the same engineering.
§521
Sentient motile function is selected in evolution because of the survival benefit that sense and
motility provides. In other words, it helps if you can both sense and react, so the two features develop
together. They are covariant.
§522
The model predicts the birth of complexity and the seeds of evolution by natural selection in
which sense plays a role.
The Biophysical EvidenceThe proposal informs biophysics.
§523
Some thinkers will, no doubt, rebel against our introduction of a new universal
primitive for a variety of reasons. Let us make some obvious observations.
§524
Proposing a new universal primitive has precedent. That precedent is, of course, Issac Newton.
§525
That such a primitive is inert and present also has precedent. That precedent is the Theory of General Relativity created by Albert Einstein.
Exploring objections, identifying evidence.
§526
We will explore objections to our premises early in the book and it is incumbent upon us to
present evidence that supports our argument.
§527
We are fortunate. The current understanding of biophysics and the available empirical data is unprecedented in
history. In recent decades it has developed at an extraordinary pace. Indeed, there is such a density of current activity that new discoveries are occurring almost
weekly.
§528
Many of these discoveries are illuminating. For example, in December 2006 the journal Nature published an article that discloses that pain is
the product of an identifiable gene [44]. The importance of this article may not be realized for some time but it is important to our
considerations. It illustrates that pain is an independently evolved biophysical system unrelated to the other
senses and that these senses can operate without the pain mechanism with no discernible ill
effects expect the inability to sense when damage is being done to the organism. Pain is not an intensity of sense, highlighting a prediction of our model that
experience is characterized and has no magnitude.
The benefits of new technology.
§529
The reason for these advances is new technology. These new technologies have been founded in the advanced methodologies of science developed
during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. They have allowed us to identify, explore and record the mechanisms of the genetic code. They have enabled us to develop detailed molecular models of biological processes.
§530
It is an illustration of the advantages of fallible science to note that these technologies are
in large part due to the advances enabled by Alan Turing whose model we challenge here.
Advances analogous to Kepler and Galileo.
§531
We view this new wealth of data as akin to the explorations of Kepler and Galileo when analyzing
the behaviors that Newton would later identify as the product of a universal primitive. In this new data we expect to find evidence to confirm our theory.
§532
For example, we may be able to provide an explanation for receptor conformance, chemotaxis, and other motility[45] in bacteria. In general, we expect to inform biophysics about the variety of synchronous
behavior that appears to be present throughout biophysical systems.
§533
We have learned of lot about what happens in biology and we hope to provide an explanation of why
it happens that way.
Extending ScienceExtending science as the noble act of our species. A unique role for our species.
§534
Science as a vehicle of understanding, unlike theology or metaphysics, it equips us
uniquely to play a role in the world that is not open to other species[46]23.
Mistaken to assume any final explanation.
§536
However, when a successful model in science is mistaken for final explanation a
problem arises; as is the case with materialism. This is especially true if the model provides a great number of useful applications that drive commerce24.
§537
We grow so familiar with the model that we come to see all the world in its light and we cannot
look upon the world without consideration of it.
§538
For us a “religion” is a philosophy, a framework of ideas, such that one cannot look upon the
world without consideration of those ideas. By this definition science is itself a religion and the theories that persist within it are
effectively the “cults” of science. They are ideas such that their proponents cannot look upon the world without consideration of
them.
§540
Yet like most religious cults they abandon essential premises of the parent. The development of these cults is contrary to the central ideas of science that reject assertion
and demand fallibility.
§541
As we have noted, Materialism is the belief in physics that we have identified
all of the essential things of the world. This is because an adherence to it has led to an appeal to a magic in emergence theory and the
return of metaphysics.
§542
Ironically, it seems that materialism persists in the scientific community in
part because it leaves room for God.
Problems in contemporary science .
§543
Contemporary science is suffering a diminished comprehension of constructive methods in part
because it is widely perceived that reductionism has failed and materialism is correct. But this is false, reductionism has not failed and materialism provides unnecessary and
unscientific limits on our conceptions.
§544
So what exactly is the problem; what of all those reductions that fail?
Asking ourselves hard questions.
§545
As we have noted, reductions necessarily have a constructive frame of
reference, no matter how poorly defined that is. If a reduction fails it cannot lead to “non-reductive” solutions,
it simply indicates that the constructive frame of reference has failed. It cannot lead to behavior that is without cause.
§546
After long inquiry we must ask ourselves the hardest of questions: How are we to extend our premises to enable a new logical construction?
§547
This is the situation that we find ourselves in.
§548
The failure of a reduction simply requires that the constructive frame of reference needs to be
reconsidered and ultimately revised to provide a casual chain constructed such that reduction
succeeds.
§549
It is by this means that inspired guesswork and empirical induction continually refines the
framework within which logical deductions are made.
§550
The end product of this process is the residual product of scientific consideration. For all practical purposes this residual is essentially what remains should the individuals
involved in its production be absent. It is captured in the marks generated by those individuals, in the syntax of the
language used in its expression and analysis. Intelligent individuals of our species are only able to engage with the existing body of
scientific knowledge by engaging with this syntactic medium.
§551
Ultimately we can only hope to extend science by extending the range of explanation provided by
this medium. Scientific contributions are ultimately measured by their refinement or extension of this
framework. It is present in the common language of science and in its logical and mathematical
clarifications. It is most effective when expressed constructively in a well-defined formal syntax of an
accessible symbolic language where interpretation is eliminated. Its apprehension by individuals that are unfamiliar with it must rely upon a minimal number of
readily accessible premises. Its veracity is measured by the degree to which its predictions coincide with the way things
are. Its statements must be consistent and confirmable. Its application is measured by the good and productive changes that it brings to our
behavior; the new things that it enables us to do.
Not everything can be known.
§552
Not everything can be known to us because we must always allow for new discovery[47][48]. To suggest otherwise denies the cornerstone of science. The fallibility of science simply asserts that for predictions to be valid they can never be mere
assertions, they must be verifiable and there must always be the potential of
new discovery that will enlighten us further.
§553
New discovery assists in the process of refinement and such discovery must always be
anticipated. The best that we can hope for from science is that it leads to periods of time where our theories
are constantly productive with beneficial effects upon our collective behavior.
§554
These periods of stability must not lead us to complacency.
§555
Nature's goals are manifest. We serve those goals when new scientific breakthroughs increase the potential long-term survival
and expansion of the living complexity that has formed upon this planet. In addition, we further nature's goals by placing the life in environments in
which it would not otherwise appear.
New Foundations To LogicThe necessary changes at the foundations of logic. Logic proper can express abstract behaviors.
§556
Logic proper really makes no assumptions about implementation. That a logical statement is valid or not is entirely dependent upon the semantic rules of the
logical language. Logical statements are perfectly capable of expressing values associated with abstract behaviors
such as “turn left.”
And makes no account of similarity of apprehender.
§557
Logical statements make no account for the similarity of the apprehender. They require only that the semantic rules are followed to produce a result. By our model then the similarity of the apprehender requires only that they are able to uniformly
apply these rules.
Turing Machines must be similar.
§558
Formalized computing machines, Turing Machines[49], have infinite storage and unlimited time in which to perform their operations. Different types of Turing machine perform different types of computation, the machines
are bound to their inputs. In our terms a Turing Machine must apprehend its input correctly to produce a meaningful
result, otherwise the meaning is arbitrary.
Universal Turing Machines perform acts of translation.
§559
A Universal Turing machine is programmable and can emulate any Turing computation. A Universal Turing Machine is modifiable so that it can read any input given. More precisely, a computation begins with a specification of the type of Turing
Machine that must be applied to its parameters. The implementation of a Universal Turing Machine is approximated in von Neumann's computer
architecture, upon which most of our computing machines are based
today.
And produce the same overall effect.
§560
In our terms a Universal Turing Machine is a translation machine, the meaning of every
input is an act of translation in which the machine modifies itself, as an
apprehender, to be similar to the Turing Machine required to compute a result from
the given parameters. The overall effect is the same as giving those parameters to the specified non-universal
machine.
§561
Is there a behavior in our mechanics that cannot be performed or that would result in a different
abstract behavior when performed by a Turing Machine?
§562
This question relates directly to the Church-Turing thesis [50]. To justify our model and what we have already said here we must offer a claim that there is
indeed a behavior in our mechanics that will result in different abstract behavior when
attempted by a Turing machine.
§563
Recall, specifically we do not claim that there is a processing of logical
statements by semantic rules that will produce a dissimilarity in a perceived symbolic result
but that a Turing Machine will produce different abstract behaviors, different
results, because it's logical operation is different.
Concurrency against constraint.
§564
Our claim is not as simple as saying that the two mechanics when executing the same computation
produce different perceived results. The computational method itself is fundamentally different. The comparison is not between the truth values produced by one and not the other. This is simply because Logic as it stands has nothing to say about implementation and the results
we consider are produced by a different method; they are concurrent and because of
physical constraints produced by a construction against our primitive they
“halt” at a point in the computational process constrained by the
physical structure in which they appear.
Emergent behavior, such as flocking.
§565
There are well known computational behaviors[51] of this kind that appear to mimic
nature, Conway's game of life and flocking behavior are examples where complex
nonlocal behavior arises from a few highly localized rules.
§566
We agree that there are indeed emergent behaviors of this kind, localized computations
constrained by their environment and the uniformity of natural laws. Flocking behavior as illustrated by these computational models, like any other fluid
behavior, results from a uniformity of law. Although we will contend that flocks of birds operate as individuals by our mechanics and so the
actual behavior of flocks of birds will differ in fact from the computational model. The computational model tells only a part of the story.
The difference in our model.
§567
So what is different in the physical constraint in our model that supports our claim?
§568
The structural deformations of the manifolds of sense are such that a conformation of the
manifold produces states of cognition and recognition in physical architectures of action
potential. It is not merely that physical structure brings Turing machines to a halt. It is rather that manifolds presenting cognition are the products of effective action potentials
and are so tied.
§569
Responses are tied to recollections and action potentials are increased by the recollection of
similarity in these structures. Decision responses are forced by environmental circumstances.
§570
An effective method that produces the result “turn left” in a Turing Machine
is produced in a manner that is quite different from the mechanics we propose.
§571
In addition, we conjecture that simulation of our model by a Turing machine is
intractable. This is because of the reliance on geometry and cognition in a complex environment of physical
behavior, the quantified characterization of the manifold of sense requires a
characterization of the manifold itself with none of the advantages of the new
architecture. In particular, it requires unnecessary storage and an absent distributed
synchronization that are, at best, difficult to implement in computational
architectures. Further, Turing machines can only envy the storage free comparison mechanisms in
our new model, necessary mechanisms are lost in any symbolic
abstraction.
We extend physical models.
§572
The one requirement in our logic that steps beyond earlier work is the necessity of a simple and
inert extension to prevailing physical models. In our logic this provides the basis of logic as differentiation.
§573
This extension is the inclusion of the basis of experience and the identification of the
role, discussed above, that this primitive plays in shaping the substantive basis
of the world. The mechanical explanation that we attempt here, describing the engineering of
sentience, is then an advance on the earlier explanations by providing an existential
basis for the characterization of sense.
Logical integration is false.
§574
We are forced to recognize that the method of constructive integration utilized in current
computational systems and proofs is inadequate.
§575
That we are able to imbue the simple mechanical actions of machinery with the benefit of a
formalized logic that captures the effective methods of thinking is a remarkable and surprising
fact.
§576
It is not, however, adequate to infer the presence of experience and it certainly
offers no explanation of sense. The approach has proven to be a useful tool in computer systems and it has enabled us to place
some part of our intelligence in mechanical devices. This is wholly unexpected.
§577
As a result we must review the foundations of logic and here we will seek to achieve several
things. Either we create a logical syntax with semantic rules that do not reduce to a point aggregate of
truth values but one that reflects the constraint of the physical and logical structure in which
it is bound or we must find a way to reconcile an aggregate truth statement with it's natural
implementation.
§578
In any case, how logical computations halt has to be reconsidered in light of the
above model.
Unifying logic and geometry.
§579
As challenging as this may sound initially, our first approach, as we
outline above, is an attempt to unify logic and geometry. Such unification has been considered before by David Hilbert[52] and Hans Reichenbach[53] in particular.
The Limits of Computational MechanicsWe identify limits in computational mechanics.
§580
Our explanation of nature identifies the limits of Turing computation and classical mechanics. We do this essentially by observing that symbolic systems, and the mathematical logic upon
which they are based, do not reflect the substantive engineering of sentience in
nature.
Computers will not awaken.
§581
Widely held expectations that our computational machines will awaken are unreasonable.
§582
This is a negative result for computer science, identifying fundamental
limits.
§583
Computer systems, as currently conceived, can never meet the expectations of twentieth
century visionaries for reasons that are fundamental to the nature of the world.
§584
For these same reasons the “Principle of Computational Equivalence” that
relies upon the notion of computational complexity, proposed by Stephen Wolfram in his book
“A New Kind of Science,” is false.
§585
Despite the often slower operation of biological operations, the broad economy of
logical differentiation is more efficient than the labor of logical integration required by
Turing machines and computational complexity is insufficient to explain the nonlocality in
sense.
Computers can never be intelligent.
§586
For these same reasons computers can never be intelligent as we are intelligent. The kind of intelligence that you possess arises only as a product of the engineering of
sentience in motile sentient organism. This is a fundamentally different kind of mechanics than that found in computers.
§587
This is not to say that intelligent machines cannot be built; by our
mechanics, ultimately, they can be. However, simple functional equivalence or bio-mimicry using existing models of
physical mechanics, the cornerstone of modern expectations, are insufficient.
Software and silicon cannot compete.
§588
The operators of computational logic do not differentiate against a manifold of any
kind, inputs are atomic and require storage and laborious
integration, in parallel computation results require distribution and
gathering.
§589
The truth value of a Turing computation is an abstract point aggregation of the logical parts. This is not how logic works in our biophysical model and we will claim that the results from work
in biophysics over the past fifteen years or more confirm this.
§590
The results of the two logic systems will differ for reasons of efficiency and nonlocal effects
in result constraints by physical structure producing a manifold of sense. Biology is a highly concurrent storage free system of distributed logical differentiations with
nonlocal effect naturally constrained by physical structure.
§591
Turing machines simply cannot compete and if allowed to run free will produce contradictions
because they do not know when to integrate or stop a concurrent computation.
§592
No symbolic system implemented in software and silicon can emulate the logical function of our
species or any other in any function that involves a sensory or motile mode. Systems of parallel computation do not help us since the fabric of parallel computation
implements no nonlocal storage free coordinated computation of the kind seen in biology. Contemporary computational logic reflects only a fragment of cognitive capacity.
§593
Simply put, computers are not engineered as sentience is engineered in nature and
it is remarkable that we can endow such machines with heuristics and imbue them with some
aspects of our intelligence.
New TechnologiesWe propose to build motile machines-that-experience.
§594
We will explore the new things that our theories may enable us to do. But why take this radical approach?
Extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence.
§595
Extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence and we simply cannot imagine a more
extraordinary way to prove the case than to carefully consider how successful theories may be
applied.
Technologies because our premises hold.
§596
The applications we consider will not be constructed by computational techniques using classical
mechanics, nor be built by electrical engineering in silicon and programmed using first order
binary logic. They will not merely simulate the behavior of biology. They will be engineered using the same fundamental principles of biophysics. They will enable new technologies that are only possible because our premises hold.
§597
Should these premises hold true, we will enable a new kind of device, machines that
experience, engineered for sentience and motile action, and capable of performing
recognition and response as we do.
Initially useful hybrids.
§598
We anticipate that these devices will initially be hybrids of biology and silicon. They will provide interfaces between today's silicon systems and biological systems. The fabrication technologies required to assemble such devices exist today in the semiconductor
and biotechnology industries where molecular engineering is fast becoming a fine art.
General purpose machines.
§599
General purpose computers have been very useful. It is not yet clear that the engineering of sentience will allow a general purpose architecture
but there is cause for optimism, at least to the degree that we oursleves are general
purpose machines.
§600
We have achieved so much in computer science but computer science has become a stagnant
domain; it has been driven more by the economic pragmatics and hyperbole of
commercial interest than research interests or truth.
§601
Perhaps it will be possible to directly program machines-that-experience using logical methods
and techniques of translation not dissimilar from those we use today in computing systems. If so these methods will build upon modifications to the foundations of mathematical
logic; at least as it pertains to the basis of relatives, differentiation, and the operation of symbolic systems.
§602
A more exciting prospect is the potential to build special purpose autonomous sentient
machines; intelligent machines that are motile, autopoietic, and with experience.
Into environments where life would not otherwise exist.
§603
Such machines could reach into the environments that are hostile to us and finally we will have
served nature's goal to extend the evolution of life beyond the confines of this fragile planet
into environments in which it would otherwise not appear.
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