Introductory Remarks
§2
This document is a draft of the introductory part of the forthcoming book Explaining
Experience In Nature: The Foundations Of Logic And Apprehension by Steven
Ericsson-Zenith. The three sections that it contains constitute the most accessible eighty pages or so (fifty-two or
more pages on your printer) of the book with notes and references but it lacks formal details. If you are interested in reviewing the formal work then please contact Steven directly.
§3
In this chapter we present the subject of the book, our approach to the problems presented, and discuss the implications of the work.
The WorkThe subject, scope, and composition of the book.
§4
Explaining Experience In NatureThe content of the book and its objectives.
§5
The present inquiry explores a constructive explanation of consciousness in nature determined by natural laws and developed from first principles. Our goal is to illustrate1 how consciousness comes into existence, the role that it plays in nature, and the mechanics of the broad range of behaviors that are its products.
§24
The foundation of this new construction is a novel account of experience in nature.
§27
By the term “experience” we refer to the basis of consciousness. It is that which is most familiar. It is common to all senses. It is the first thing and the last thing for each of us. Though strictly, according to the model we will present, the first and the last thing
for each of us is a sense, the primitive we will propose characterized by biophysical
structure.
§28
From the beginning we take the existential status of experience seriously. It is something that exists in the world.
A new primitive; the root of complexity.
§32
All the world derives from primitive nature. Primitive nature is (currently) inaccessible2 . However, three aspects of primitive nature are apprehensible and universally covariant[1]: these are mass/energy, gravitation, and a primitive aspect of the world that is the basis of experience. Each aspect is necessary to provide a constructive explanation of the world and together they are
sufficient. The current work explores the introduction of this last aspect of primitive nature, a
primitive of experience, as a necessary distinction for an explanation that includes
biophysics and consciousness.
§53
In our model this universal primitive is an aspect of the world that affects physical
assembly simply by its presence. Although it is inert, in the same way that gravitation is inert, it is the
root of all complexity.
§57
The new mechanics we propose characterizes the products of a natural assembly against3 this previously unconsidered primitive. The constructed mechanism is the basis of sensory differentiation and biophysical response.
§60
This newly proposed aspect of primitive nature has the same existential status as gravitation and
mass/energy. It is a universal a priori aspect of nature just as gravitation4 is considered universal in General Relativity; and it is inert as gravitation
is inert. Most important of all for us here, like gravitation it has a characterizable effect upon the formation of physical structure5 .
Examining behaviors associated with consciousness.
§72
As we proceed we will examine the behaviors associated with consciousness as described by a new
mechanics. These behaviors are the emergent products of the unfolding world naturally engineered by this
mechanics and the evolutionary principle of natural selection. They include the obvious products of experience: the variety of sense, the behavior of organisms, and the forms of intelligence that underlie them.
§81
On our journey we will develop foundations for the mathematical characterization of the range of
behaviors that we consider. In that effort we develop a calculus for this new mechanics, inclusive of
biophysics. The objective of this calculus is to enable us to reason rigorously about the formation of sensory and motile structures, and their operation. With this understanding of individual organisms we are then able to suggest a model for reasoning
about their behavior in groups.
Challenges formalizing the model.
§85
We must navigate significant challenges before we can formalize our model. We will defend a claim that the established foundations of logic and geometry contain assumptions
that, if left unchallenged, limit our formal inquiry. This is because the intuitions upon which they are based relate directly to our
subject, they are assumptions concerning the nature of apprehension.
§86
These claims will lead us inevitably to review assumptions in the foundations of mathematical
physics. And these challenges are difficult because they reject cherished beliefs.
§87
For example, we will argue that the “orthogonality” pervasive in our mathematics6 is false and has the effect of misdirecting problem solving behavior in physics. And so we challenge the conventional allowance of unlimited dimensions in contemporary mathematical physics.
§92
We argue that the Turing implementation of logical computation is false and constrained by limits
that are fundamental to the world. To support this argument we show that the Turing implementation of logical machines is unlike the
biophysical implementation and unable to compete with the efficiency found there. To this end we offer a conjecture concerning the Church-Turing thesis. This conjecture illustrates how and why systems built with Turing Machines will produce
behaviors, our measure of results, that differ from the behaviors produced by our
mechanics.
§93
We will have made progress on our journey if we can demonstrate that the new calculus can predict
biophysical sensory and motile function. We will have proof of these theories in practice if we can use the mechanics described to
implement new sensory and motile technologies, machines that experience.
The Field Of EndeavorA summary of our field of inquiry.
§94
When consideration of logic goes beyond the effective techniques of syntax and semantic rules in symbolic systems to include the essential basis of apprehension and
operation of the mind it is more rightly called “semeiotic theory,” the study of “signs.”
§111
Semeiotic theory, the subject of logical positivism and pragmaticism is a field of inquiry that develops general theories of signs and we develop
such a theory here. The theory is built constructively upon the natural mechanics of sense and motility that we
propose.
Differentiated experiences.
§123
There is some diversity and ambiguity in the literature concerning the exact definition of a
sign. We adopt the simplest and least ambiguous definition: a sign is simply a differentiated experience.
Physic, Ethic, Semeiotic.
§124
In his essay concerning human understanding the English philosopher John Locke divides the objects of our understanding into three distinct areas of intellectual
consideration: Physics, Ethics, and Semeiotic7 .
§130
He puts it this way [2]:
| ❝ |
§131
All that can fall within the compass of human understanding, being either, FIRST, the nature
of things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation
[Physics]: or, SECONDLY, that which man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary
agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happiness [Pragmatics or Ethics]: or,
THIRDLY, the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is
attained and communicated [Semeiotics] .
John Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (1690) |
§132
Locke saw these as three distinct areas of study.
| ❝ |
§133
For a man can employ his thoughts about nothing, but either, the contemplation of THINGS
themselves, for the discovery of truth; or about the things in his own power, which are his
own ACTIONS, for the attainment of his own ends; or the SIGNS the mind makes use of both in
the one and the other, and the right ordering of them, for its clearer information. All which three, viz. THINGS, as they are in themselves knowable; ACTIONS as they depend on us, in order to
happiness; and the right use of SIGNS in order to knowledge, being [utterly] different, they
seemed to me to be the three great provinces of the intellectual world, wholly separate and
distinct one from another.
John Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (1690) |
A continuum from physics through biology including signs.
§134
We will show, however, that these three are not distinct. An intellectual understanding of one is intrinsically dependent upon an intellectual
understanding of the others. Put another way, we will show that there exists a continuum from elementary
physics through biology, covariant with the embodiment of signs, and the inevitable
and volitional behaviors that arise.
Genetic disposition mitigated by convention.
§135
We will show that the behaviors of all organisms are the natural product of the genetic
disposition of physiology in its environment, mitigated by the embodied epistemic
state, the embodiment of signs derived from apprehension and defining
commitments made by the organism.
§136
Thus, for us, semeiotic theory is naturally first among sciences. It is through semeiotic theory that we infer the physical basis of nature as well as the
operation of individuals and behavior of those individuals in groups.
It deals with how and why we understand the world.
§137
It is semeiotic theory that leads us to a sense that captures an understanding of the
world. The product of this semeiosis, the semeiotic process embodied by an
individual, are the marks, the subjects of signs, that represent our expression and analysis
of that sense.
Against Prevailing ViewsOur model and approach challenges prevailing views.
§145
The present work challenges a number of prevailing views. In particular, we make the following observations:
§146
The failure of a logical reduction cannot lead to supernatural conclusions. By necessity such failures lead us to reconsider, and ultimately
revise, the basis of the logical construction in which the reduction failed.
§147
The mechanism of logical differentiation in biophysical structure produces results that
differ from those produced by the mechanism of logical integration (the
mechanism of contemporary computing machines).
§148
This difference is most obvious in implementation at scale and is due to the distinct
mechanisms of logical differentiation and integration.
§149
In essence the primitive we propose enables a fundamentally different computational
mechanics: a manifold, with no storage required, of parallel computation against which
nonlocal differentiated results form in a physical structure closely bound to associated
action potentials in a system of recognition. When a manifold conforms to an action state the cascade of biological events necessary
for directed action occur.
§150
The classical logic of integration is limited and unable to compete with this simple
efficiency.
§151
This is a controversial claim and, if it holds, it is a negative result for
computer science.
§152
This same mechanism also produces results that differ from those of conventional
“computational complexity” in explanations of physical behavior
involving sentience.
§153
Conventional “computational complexity,” the product of uniform
classical mechanics, has no differentiating physics or logical constraint. Without such constraint the behavior arising is different than that predicted in our new
computational model.
§154
This too is a controversial claim and will be a negative result for computer science.
§155
Later we discuss the implications of these two claims to the Church-Turing Thesis.
§156
There remains the question as to whether heuristic machines in efficient switching
materials are more or less efficient for certain end results than the mechanisms
referred to above.
§157
Despite this, and despite the manifest success of chess playing machines, we
conjecture that conventional machines implementing heuristics cannot ultimately solve
problems involving recognition for reasons that are fundamental to the world. By this we refer to the basic ability of organisms, that is indifferent to their
size and complexity, to consistently recollect similarity in their environment and
act appropriately.
§158
Certain basic notions in the language of mathematics, derived from received
authority, are false intuitions. One such notion is the geometric notion of perpendicular
“orthogonality” that leads to unconstrained dimensions in analytic
algebra.
§159
We will not present it in these introductory remarks but later we present an experimental
geometry as the basis of our calculus that does not use the conventional notion of
orthogonality. Instead of an unlimited dimensional geometry that starts with “point,” “line,” “plane” we begin with “length” and derive “plane”
and “point” as necessary distinctions . This geometry was considered in part earlier by Ernst Mach as a geometry in which length
is the fundamental metric[3]. The geometry is unrestricted by perpendicular orthogonality yet it still provides solids, planes, and unique points. It provides a new coordinate system well suited to our task.
§160
A resulting bias in the foundations of mathematics, the acceptance of an unlimited
“dimensionality” in analytic algebra, leads to the misdirection
of problem solving behavior in mathematical physics.
§161
As a consequence we argue, consistent with Einstein, and Godel[4], that the notion of
“time” is merely a way of speaking about the world. It follows then, consistent with Mach[5] and Einstein, that the notion of “space”
is also. For us “spacetime” is simply a way of speaking about mass/energy.
§162
We will explore a model of mass/energy as a natural “tension” in the
geometry of the world in which there exists no universal metric. We pursue this goal in expectation that it leads to a characterization of sense and
motility.
§163
Finally, and perhaps most controversial, we claim a necessary extension of physics8 , a universal basis of experience whose role in nature is the
production of physical complexity.
§166
In the following sections we address each of these observations in sufficient detail to justify
their further investigation.
Rescuing Reductionism
§167
The failure of a logical reduction cannot lead us to supernatural conclusions. By necessity such failures lead us to reconsider, and ultimately
revise, the basis of the logical construction in which the reduction failed.
§168
The present work advocates the return of certain scientific principles[6] and the rejection of metaphysics, in the pursuit of a systematic
and rigorous logical construction of the world. We pursue the development of such a construction.
§169
Logical constructions of this kind approximate the way things are with increasing degrees of
completeness; in a continuous refinement that eliminates contradiction
and defers to the evidence.
§170
Reductions within such frameworks must lead to verifiable predictions about the behavior of
the world. The failure of such reductions by evidence or contradiction cannot lead us to supernatural
conclusions. By necessity such failures lead us to reconsider and ultimately revise the basis of
the construction in which the reduction failed.
§171
This view, surprisingly perhaps, is contrary to prevailing views in contemporary
science proposed by several leading emergence theorists and some physicists.
§172
Advocates of these views include mathematicians Stephen Wolfram[7] and Gregory Chaitin[8], biologist and complexity theorist Stuart Kauffman[9], and cognitive theorist Douglas Hofstadter[10]all of whom have written recent books on the subject. However, the argument itself is not new[11].
§178
According to these accounts the basis of experience is not universally primitive but is
solely a product of the evolved parts assembled. Typically, it is manifest in these arguments as an identity with some observable
phenomenon. And it is important to note immediately that experience in these theories has no role in the
world.
Accepting “the adjacent possible.”
§179
To be clear, we do not challenge arguments that support the increasing of
what is logically possible based upon what has gone before. We accept as an epistemic argument, for example, Stuart Kaufmann's notion of
unpredictable novelty in possibilities that are adjacent. We simply challenge the notion that experience can be among them. Only what can happen may happen.
§180
Emergence theories of experience echo the philosophy of mind known as identity
theory attributed to Herbert Feigl(1950s)[12][13] and others. Feigl is a member of “the Vienna Circle.”9 We will hear much about the Vienna Circle in our historical narrative.
§183
These theories argue that there is not only a one-to-one correspondence between conscious
events and physical events but that the physical events are in fact the conscious events. In these models there is no mystery to the physical events involved they are simply the
product of conventional mechanics.
Identity and epiphenomena are indistinguishable.
§184
An older and frequent alternative argument made by some philosophers is that experience is an epiphenomenon[14], a phenomenon that
arises as the extra product of known mechanics and evolutionary theory.
§185
Here we will treat theories of identity and epiphenomena in the same way. We do so because the two theories are logically indistinguishable. Whether experience is the incidental product of evolved mass/energy or the events of
mass/energy themselves simply cannot be detected. What is more, if one or the other is in fact the case then the matter here
can never be resolved.
§186
In both models no aspect of experience is existent prior to the physical assembly that
embodies it and experience plays no role in the mechanics of observable events. Experience is simply along for the ride. As long as these theories provide no role for experience in nature they amount to a form of
dualism and no real progress on the matter has been made.
Materialism assumes all essential things discovered.
§187
The unspoken premise of these models is materialism. We take the view of materialism to imply a belief that our physical models are complete in
all important respects. According to this view contemporary physical theory captures all the essential
things of the world.
Chaitin illustrates the problem.
§188
Materialism is justified in a version of emergence theory by taking the position that levels of constructive complexity introduce new
phenomena into the world and, to quote Chaitin[15]:
| ❝ |
§190
When you go to a higher level, the lower level may be irrelevant.
Gregory Chaitin. P.151, Sensual Mathematics,Conversations with a Mathematician. (2002) |
§191
In correspondence with the author Chaitin says (quoted with
permission):
| ❝ |
§192
... physicists and cosmologists are doing metaphysics again. Have you heard of the string theory landscape or the inflationary universe multiverse or
Max Tegmark's ideas on parallel (all mathematically possible)
universes? The general idea is that only the space of all possible physical laws is of
interest, and the particular laws of this universe are not of great
interest, since it is only, so to speak, our address in the multiverse
of all possibilities.
Gregory Chaitin. A New Kind of Metaphysics. (2008) In correspondence with the author. |
§193
This correspondence illustrates two issues that we will address here. The first is the acceptance of the supernatural, metaphysics. This is due to a failed reduction and a failure to recognize the necessity to review the
basis of the construction that leads to it. The second is a semeiotic issue that relates to how assumptions of received authority in our
mathematical formalism, in this case in the notion of unlimited
orthogonality, has misdirected problem solving behavior in mathematical physics.
§194
The idea of parallel universes or unlimited dimensions is based upon a false
intuition, it is a clear and unsupportable fantasy. And while the idea of multiple universes in Inflationary Theory is intriguing
(where expansion of the world leads to units separating at faster than the speed
of light) there is little justification for any claim that the laws within
these “universes” are not precisely the same.
New properties do emerge but maintain functional dependence.
§195
New properties of nature obviously do emerge and there is an equally obvious
correspondence, an identity, between the physical assembly that manifests the
property and the property itself. However, from the constructive point of view that we will follow in this work
nothing new is brought into the world except a new assembly of its essential parts.
Laws and PrinciplesThe uniformity of natural law.
§196
A central premise for us is that the natural laws are uniform, that they are
everywhere the same. We argue that this uniformity is profound, the cause of perceived
universals. And our model relies upon it.
§197
The world then, in our model, is a natural construction according to the laws of primitive nature (a priori determinants) and the principles (posterior determinants) that arise in the combination of these laws.
§200
In accord with the laws of conservation and equilibrium in thermodynamics these
emergent properties transform, their structures change, and these new forms play
a continuing role in the physical systems in which they appear.
§201
Yet in the argument we have heard from contemporary emergence theory experience has none of
these features. It translates to no other form and it plays no continuing role.
Materialism forbids discovery.
§202
The emergence theory expounded by Chaitin and others is the product of a failed reduction. It is the inevitable logical consequence of a strict adherence to a materialist
construction, a construction that forbids discovery in the foundations of the
world.
The necessary expansion of physical theory.
§203
To escape this inevitable conclusion, since it is clearly inadequate, we are
required to expand our physical theory, to change the basis of our logical
construction of the world as the philosopher of science Rudolf Carnap (as we
will hear shortly), and contemporary physicist Roger Penrose[16][17], have anticipated:
| ❝ |
§204
... it seems to me that a fundamental physical theory that lays claim to any kind of
completeness at the deepest levels of physical phenomena must also have the potential to
accommodate conscious mentality ... My arguments demand that this missing theory must be a non-computational theory
...
Roger Penrose. 34.7,The Road to Reality. (2004) |
§205
We agree with Penrose that our physical models are incomplete. Our goal here, however, is to identify new mathematics that accommodates
“conscious mentality” from which we can derive the world.
Changing The Operational Basis Of Logic And ApprehensionThe mechanisms of sensory differentiation in biophysics necessarily produce results that
differ from those produced by the mechanisms of logical integration in traditional theories
of computation.
§206
We propose a revision to the operational basis at the foundations of logic. The proposal is not novel. It is, in fact, the dominant view of logicians prior to the current era.
§207
We will present an historical narrative that illustrates this divide in
logic, placing the strong locality of conventional computational logic against
the nonlocality manifest in our sensory experience. At the center of this narrative, representing each side of the debate, is the work
of Alan Turing and Rudolf Carnap.
Producing different results.
§208
This divide is mechanistic and fundamental to the implementation of logic. Critically, we claim that the results produced by these two views differ.
§209
There are two aspects of conventional logical machines to consider: integrative logic and computational complexity.
§217
Integrative logic is the logic of computer systems. The results it produces are aggregations of strongly localized truth values. A result is a “truth” value.
§218
The conventional study of “computational complexity” looks at behaviors
produced by these systems in the highly parallel case, where there are, at
least conceptually, many such logical machines working concurrently and uniformly
applying simple rules. Examples are fractals and algorithms such as Conway's game of life[18]. The result is some characteristic behavior.
A manifold of parallel computation is enabled.
§219
The different results produced by differentiation arise at scale because the primitive we
propose enables a manifold of parallel “computation” formed against our
primitive in a physical structure of sense and associated action potentials. It is unified and storage free implementing cognition and motile behavior. Because it relies on these essential features of our physics it cannot be simulated by
conventional machines.
Limits of conventional operations.
§220
Conventional computational complexity is not constrained in this way. It has no physics of nonlocal differentiation and no logical constraint. There is no point at which the system produces a nonlocal differentiation of the kind seen in
sensory architectures.
§221
The converse is the case for logical integration. Logical integration is constrained by the rules of logic and forced to a localized
reduction, a final aggregation of the logical parts, a
single truth value. In this case logic is forced to take steps too far and is unable reduce across a manifold of
the kind we propose.
§222
This difference then derives from the nature of locality in these logical mechanisms and the
effect introduced by the primitive we propose. This is aided by the fact that storage, required in the Turing model, is not
required in our model because there is a direct covariance between the structure of the
physical manifold and cognition/recognition enabled by the primitive.
The basis of memory and the recollection of similarity.
§223
Since the action of a given manifold will always produce the same sense we also have the
basis of memory. And we get the recollection of similarity for free, structures partially reformed
will produce a partial sense ; providing a foundation for
analogy. In such an architecture there is no need for storage.
§224
Action potentials are covariant with the recollection of similarity. Action behaviors occur either at the point of recognition or when physical circumstances
require the organism to modify behavior, a forced collapse to a decision point at
which the organism senses what it anticipates and acts accordingly.
§225
Does an organism make a “choice” and, if it does, are such
choices “freely” or “randomly” made?
§226
Immediate choices in our model are inevitable, the outcome of action potentials in
the established structure of these covariant manifolds. These action points are points of cognition that are refined by the processing of signs
( semeiosis ). We say “refined” because even if the inputs have not been encountered
before there exists an a priori manifold born of genetic structure.
§227
In terms of behavior in our species this model tells us that immediate choices are
determined: simply put, things happen, we apprehend them, and then we perceive them as our choice. Our volition, if there is any, exists in how we define ourselves, how
the manifolds of sense have been refined by semeiosis in our development.
§228
Mechanistically: responses are not exactly “random” or “free.” The responses are constrained by the manifolds involved. If a point of recognition is reached then that determined behavior will follow10 . If a decision is forced by either external or systemic constraint before this point then the
response associated with the most similar recognition will occur. If there are multiple of these then one of them will occur or the organism will exhibit a confused state11 .
The nature of the difference.
§231
We judge the difference we are exploring not by some perceived result from conventional
symbolic logic but by resulting behavior. Specifically, it is not that the perceived truth values of logical statements
differ in the two mechanics but rather that the truth values are concurrent, nonlocal
coexisting differentiations distributed across a physical structure, and at scale
classical Turing computations cannot deal with this concurrency and nonlocal decision
making.
The limits of conventional computational complexity.
§232
The power of conventional computational complexity is often cited as a sufficient explanation
for complex behaviors. We certainly accept the fluid and solid behaviors that arise this way from the uniformity of
natural law in classical mechanics. But conventional computational complexity provides no account for the manifest nonlocality in
sense, it provides no account of experience in nature. And this should be the most compelling reason to reject current notions of computational
complexity as the explanation of nonlocal behavior in sensory architectures.
§233
Emergent behavior by the application of simple uniform laws is a necessary part of our
explanation but it is logically insufficient if those laws are constrained to those of
conventional computation or classical mechanics. The limits of computational complexity as currently conceived are, in fact, that
it is not limited by the natural differentiating constraints that we propose.
The limits of integrative logic.
§234
It is certainly not necessary in biology to integrate all the results before action is taken
in our model, the distributed logic in our mechanics is bound to a manifold of
distributed action potential and constrained by the physical structure. In terms of efficiency Turing computation is unable to benefit from the unified nonlocal
differentiations freely available in biophysical structure according to our model.
§235
In other words, the concurrency we suggest is not merely the functional
composition of localized computations that synchronize before proceeding or common events
executed by all but is, rather, an intrinsic concurrency associated with logical
differentiation upon these manifolds.
Intrinsic concurrency, not “entanglement.”
§236
To avoid confusion we steer clear of suggesting that this mechanism be called
“entanglement,” a term used in Quantum Mechanics to refer to
an observer based phenomenon.
§237
We can uncover a deeper understanding if we analyse the concurrency of these manifolds with
the classic process algebra[19][20] of Communicating
Sequential Processes (CSP). If, for simplicity, we use just two processes and to represent two distinct points on our manifold then concurrency of the following
type is suggested:
§238
.
§239
Processes and are concurrent and share events in the set of events they may perform (in the
“alphabet” of possible events) and these events they must perform
together. For example, as the idealized synchronized sequence of the form:
§240
.
§241
The process points on the manifold are unified in some sensory behavior and then together
perform some action.
§242
This is not the case in our proposal. In our model there is no delineation between sense and act, they continuously
covary. In addition, the action at each point is dissimilar, the
cooperative concurrent action is not uniform. The form of the biophysical manifold changes and the sense changes. At some point in this covariance they produce the “desired effect.” What is it, we may ask, that leads this physical system from gentle cogitation to
deliberate act?
§243
The nature of these events cannot be synchronized as identical local events as is generally
conceived in the process algebra of CSP. In other words the concurrent process is not a collection of “Communicating
Sequential Processes” but rather a single coherent concurrent event. These events are differentiations upon a manifold that is intrinsic and intrinsically binds
the manifold. The process is a distributed structural entity, it is a manifold of some
“shape,” and it is the prior conformance of this entity that is
bound to particular subsequent unified actions that are also unique “actions
together.” The processes do not make local choices before proceeding, they join together in a
grand unified inevitable action.
§244
The synchronization mechanism that we propose here is an uncommon event and the result of
physical structure formed against an inert primitive absent in other models. The deformations of this structure characterize sense and construct against it an associated
action potential. It is the shaping of this manifold that leads to synchronized behavior in its continuous
deformations.
§245
There is then an intrinsic unity across the behavior of the representative processes and born of their physical structure against the primitive we propose. This “action potential,” a complex event of the
manifold, leads to a collective unified response.
§246
By analogy this is precisely the same kind of covariant behavior that constrains conventional
computational complexity in the gravitational field.
§247
The difference in result then would be illustrated by, for example, the direction
an organism takes as the result of a given environmental input. We suggest, essentially, that organisms implemented with Turing machines will fail
where organisms implemented with our new mechanics will survive.
§248
Our model suggests a new way to view the structure and architecture of neurons. It suggests that the complex and dynamic manifold constructed by the neuron's cell structure
along with the manifolds formed by collections of neurons and other cells is the method of
memory and refining thought, a particular manifold configuration corresponding to
a differentiated recollection of similarity and motile response. Hence no storage is required in conventional terms.
§249
This suggests that electrical behavior in neurons should not be viewed as signaling activity
but should be looked at for its effect upon neuron structure. In our model it is the conformational dynamics of neurons and the membranes in which they
reside that produces covariant sense and motile action.
§250
First we observe a manifest nonlocality in sense that is explicitly unaccounted for in the
work of Alan Turing[21]. This nonlocality is most readily observed in any visual scene of the least complexity. The scene does not reduce to a point. In addition, while observing the scene other senses are present. We can hear the music of Beethoven and taste the sweet honey while observing the sunset. This unified differentiation is not a feature of the Turing model of computation or
conventional computational complexity.
Covariance of sense and motility.
§251
Next we observe that sense and motility are covariant. This is not the same as saying that there is an identity but only that the two phenomena are
mutually effective in precisely the same sense that the gravitational field and mass/energy
exhibit general covariance.
§252
The manifest effect of gravitation characterized by the curvature of Einstein's
“spacetime” is that observed by Newton, any two bodies appear
to have a mutual attraction that varies, roughly, as the inverse square of the
distance between them.
§253
It's important to note here the nonlocal nature of gravitation and our new primitive. The gravitational effect is a covariant differentiation and this is similar to the effect
that we propose.
§254
The manifest effect of our proposed primitive, however, is more subtle. Clearly mass/energy is again an equal player in the game. It's structure and behavior in this case is exactly that which characterizes the form of
sense just as its structure characterizes the form of the gravitational field.
Evolution toward an ever richer characterization of sense.
§255
The manifest effect of our proposed primitive, the role that it plays in
nature, is the formation of motile structures constructing, by natural
selection, an ever richer characterization of sense.
§256
In other words, natural selection does the rest because richer motile sensory
systems provide a survival advantage. If our model holds, an organism will always turn toward the richer
characterization of sense, whatever behavior this may imply in the context of the
organism in its environment.
In cell forms and membranes.
§257
The basic elements of these structures are the cellular forms familiar to us in biophysics
and an even richer characterization comes from manifolds of these cells when assembled
together into membrane structures that develop individuated senses and other motile
structures in an organism.
§258
This individuated structure of sense, a physical differentiation against our primitive
evolved in the cause of an organism's structure, is dependent upon the structural form
of a collection of cells but is independent of the individual cells that form the
manifold. Cells can be replaced by equivalent cells and the sensory manifold remains intact.
Why you do not feel what I feel.
§259
This individuation is critical and explains why it is that you do not feel what I do despite the universal nature of the primitive12 . The focus of the sensory structures is directed toward a particular characterization and this
effectively isolates that sense to the individual organism. Similarly, in the formation of complex organisms such characterizations can
be isolated to subsystems of the structure.
§264
To state the proposal more directly in the familiar case: a flexible sphere in some medium forms a simple manifold of sense, a physical
structure in which the primitive we propose can demonstrate its role. A simple deformation of the surface of this sphere, in conjunction with the sense
produced by such a deformation, that is beneficial to the survival of the structure in
its environment is enough to begin the process of natural selection in that environment that
leads to more complex organisms.
§265
The flexible sphere in some medium is the simplest example of our mechanics. Such a sphere is an uncharacterized manifold of sense. A distortion on the surface of the sphere produces the covariant motility and initiates the
characterization of a manifold of sense.
§266
This is the earliest processing of signs ( “semeiosis” ) and the simplest form of “cognition.” “Recognition” is simply a return to form, a structural
conformance. When placed in the environment in which natural selection has enough options this mechanics
constructs sense and motility suited to survival. And there you have it, a richer characterization of sense and motile action is
achieved by continuous evolution of these deformations.
§268
The effect, we predict, will be independent of material or scale. As long as the structural properties prevail the mechanics will apply.
§269
On their own these simple manifolds can evolve into single cell microorganisms. Such microorganisms eventually evolve complex receptors, motor skills, and genetic architectures in the support of the various characterizations of sense in deformations of their
structures. This mechanism explains, for example, how and why bacteria migrate along a glucose
gradient. Bacteria possess a simple sensory mechanism characterized by the response to glucose and tied
to the motile actions required to stimulate the sense further.
§270
The primitive extends this architecture of sense across many cells so that similar cells can
be an element of a larger manifold, a biophysical membrane in which
the sense is characterized and the corresponding behaviors supporting motile action
exist.
Biophysical implementation of logic.
§271
Thus the biophysical implementation of logic by this model is intrinsically bound to the form
and behavior of physical structure and cannot be localized into interpretations of bits and
bytes.
§272
This is true even though we are able to invent such interpretations as the produce of
reason, as ways of speaking about the world. Such symbolic systems, based upon a conception of truth that reduces to a cognitive
point representing a decision or proof, are unable to perform the direct connection
between highly distributed unified sense and action that comes for free in natural
implementations in the manifolds that we describe. In other words, something essential is lost in such an interpretations.
A conjecture concerning heuristic machines.
§273
There remains the question of whether heuristic machines in fast switching materials perform
with more or less efficiency than the mechanics described above. We conjecture that they cannot. Specifically, we claim that despite the success of chess playing
machines; heuristic machines cannot ultimately solve the problems of recognition
for the reasons, fundamental to the world, described above.
§274
This intuition is based upon the obvious benefits of sensory differentiation that is bound to
motile action and requires no storage architecture, against the disadvantage of
the need to scatter and gather results in concurrent systems that implement classical
logic. We consider the nature of a formal proof of this claim.
Identifying Bias In The Foundations Of MathematicsCertain basic notions, such as conventional “orthogonality,” in the language of mathematics, derived from received authority, are
false. Assumptions in mathematics concerning apprehension.
§275
To enable a new mechanics that provides the characterization of the model we have just
outlined we must first address issues in the foundations of mathematics that relate to
apprehension. Certain notions in the language of mathematics, derived from received
authority, contain assumptions about our apprehension of the world that our model can
inform. If left in place these false intuitions will compromise our calculus.
Rejecting perpendicular orthogonality.
§276
The first and perhaps most significant of these notions is that of perpendicular
“orthogonality.”
§277
We will define “orthogonality” here broadly as the logical relation of one
concept to another that asserts that the concepts do not intersect anywhere in their
development, though they have a common conceptual “starting”
point. The example analogy is the notion of intersecting lines.
§278
This notion is a familiar foundation in geometry and algebra, generally pervasive
in our mathematics, and intrinsic to Cartesian
systems. It is a notion that derives from our earliest mathematical considerations. But the justification for this notion is an intuition nurtured solely by received
authority.
An experimental geometry as the basis of our calculus.
§279
Here we will argue that this orthogonality, leading to unlimited geometric
“dimensions,” is a false intuition and simply a way of speaking
about the world.
§280
We will describe an experimental geometry that has a different orthogonality with naturally
finite dimensions; equally capable of characterizing physical structure. It is a geometry predisposed to characterizing cellular forms and their structure as
manifolds. From this same geometry we will introduce a number theory that eliminates infinities and
provides an analytical algebra that we currently propose as the basis of our calculus. Instead of an unlimited dimensional geometry that starts with “point,” “line,” “plane” we begin with “length” and derive “plane” and
“point” as necessary distinctions.
Must apply to all physical systems.
§281
For this mathematics to gain acceptance it must apply to all physical systems. However, we will not require that it be convenient to apply to human
affairs. In addition to our new mechanics, therefore, it should be possible using the new
geometry to re-characterize General Relativity but it is not necessary, for
example, for the derived new formalism to be convenient to use in trade and
commerce.
§282
We will also investigate the implication of our proposal to conventional logic. In particular, we look into the implication to formal logic of nonlocal
differentiation distributed across unified manifolds. This may enlighten us, for example, concerning the nature and apprehension of
formal completeness.
§283
We will find other issues in the foundations of mathematics but, for the most
part, these have been explored by others. In particular, when dealing with what we will call “inevitable
behavior,” the kind of determinism (unavoidable
behaviors) produced by our mechanics, we will take a position that
probability is epistemic. That is, we will adopt the view that probability theories are a way of
speaking about the world.
Epistemic PrimacyThe source of that which is most certain is the refinement of concepts as necessary
distinctions and ways of speaking.
§284
In everything that we describe here, as there must be in all scientific
work, there are base assumptions concerning the content of what we say, the
way we speak about the world and the existential status of that referred to. So to be clear we briefly state our epistemic model here and we will explore it in more
detail in the following section on our model of existence.
Necessary distinctions and ways of speaking.
§285
We place epistemic primacy, the source of that which is most certain, with the
refinement by the mechanics we propose of “necessary distinctions” and note that such a distinction must be drawn between necessary distinctions and “ways of speaking” about the world. A necessary distinction is itself a “necessary distinction” and way of
speaking is itself “a way of speaking” and the distinction between the
two is a necessary one.
§290
A necessary distinction is distinguished by its “force” upon us. A way of speaking is distinguished by its “force” upon the world. One is a distinction of the world acting upon our mechanics, the other is
distinction of our mechanics acting upon the world. These are the elements of our epistemology.
§291
This is not to say that one is “true” and not the other. In fact both may correspond to the fact of the matter, to the way things are in
the world.
Distinct existential status.
§292
Ways of speaking do not possess the existential framework of necessary distinctions. And it should also be clear that all that we say is a way of speaking until the distinctions
to which that speech refers, the necessary distinctions that are claimed by
it, have impressed themselves upon us. And this must not be achieved merely by the force of what is said but by the evident
truth. Thus necessary distinctions and ways of speaking are both products of our mechanics.
§293
Let us briefly draw here an example from the work that will follow. We will claim that mass/energy, gravitation, and the primitive that we propose are necessary distinctions, aspects of primitive
nature; while we will claim that space and time, or
spacetime, are simply ways of speaking about mass/energy.
Distinguishing necessary distinctions and ways of speaking.
§294
How are we to distinguish one from the other? In some cases it is easy enough, “house” is a necessary
distinction while “home” is a way of speaking often about houses.
§295
A necessary distinction can always be distinguished from a way of speaking by the definition
we have provided above in our mechanics.
§296
Informally, a necessary distinction is distinguished by its
“force” upon us independent what people say.
§297
You may hesitate and say that the three primitive aspects of the world mentioned above do not
themselves have a force upon us since nowhere can they be found in distinction. Nowhere can I find mass/energy alone or gravitation or even the primitive we propose. Surely they are not distinctions but are also ways of speaking about the
world, the product of reason alone?
§298
The answer is that they are indeed necessary distinctions, for without them there
are no other distinctions. Thus necessary distinctions are the elements and components of a logical construction with an
existential status before ways of speaking.
§299
Ways of speaking about the world are a very useful means of making intellectual progress. They may indeed accurately describe the world. But if ways of speaking are not about necessary distinctions then they are vacuous.
§300
As a practical matter do not let this concern you too much. However, it is mentioned here because we will use this distinction between
necessary distinctions and ways of speaking throughout and in a very particular way in our
inquiry.
The Misdirection Of Problem Solving Behavior In PhysicsThis bias in the foundations of mathematics leads to the misdirection of problem solving
behavior in mathematical physics.
§301
Combined, these observations suggest that problem solving behavior in
mathematical physics has been misdirected by the formal language that it uses.
Dimensionality a way of speaking about the world.
§302
In particular, the acceptance of unconstrained
“dimensionality” as the basis of formal physical description is often
given the existential status of a necessary distinction when this has no basis.
§303
Despite words of caution from many, including Einstein and Godel, there is wide
acceptance that time is a necessary distinction and that the perpendicular
“dimensions” of space are more than a simple pragmatic, a
useful way of speaking about the world.
Pedagogy leads to false acceptance.
§304
The way we teach physics, General Relativity in particular, indoctrinates students
and the general public with the notion. For most students and public “spacetime” is an existent phenomenon and not
simply a convenient way of speaking about the world as Einstein had suggested in his
original presentation of the subject[22].
Leads physics into fancy.
§305
The received authority of unlimited dimensionality has led to serious and intriguing
mathematics, much of which has proven useful, but it has also led to physical
proposals that would otherwise be rejected as simple nonsense.
§306
“Many-worlds” theories and some “parallel universe”
theories, relying upon the authority of unlimited orthogonality, abound. These fantasies have entered into popular culture as plausible conceptions of the world and
yet they have no obvious merit beyond their entertainment value.
§307
The force of received authority at these fundamental levels has led many physicists, and
mathematicians such as Chaitin, into a Wonderland as rich in fancy as any faced by Alice[23].
Quantum Mechanics physically vacuous.
§308
The worst of it is Quantum Mechanics itself where we deal entirely with the past and the
future and not at all with the present, failing to observe the necessity that
consideration of the past and the future is physically vacuous.
§309
The results of Quantum Mechanics are, in our view, simply a matter of record. The distinctions are necessary and the ways of speaking are to a large degree true but these
distinctions are empty. They simply concern matters of record, past and future, and none of it exists13 .
Existential ThinkingAn existential model that includes experience as more than a spectator.
§311
Uniformity and DistinctionThe uniformity of natural law and existential distinction in our model.
§312
If dualism[24] then is to be rejected, and
experience is not to be dismissed, there is a necessity that in our new construction
an element of that which we liberally label consciousness is a primitive aspect of
the world. This being the case our new primitive must play a role in the formation of physical
structures.
Effects later in the evolving cosmology.
§313
Like gravitation the effect of this aspect of primitive nature does not become manifest until
later in the development of the unfolding universe. Since this effect appears much later in the evolving cosmology this primitive aspect must be
considered a much “weaker” influence than the gravitational field.
§314
As discussed in the previous section, these effects can be characterized as a
sensory and motile manifold.
Existential status derived from primitive nature.
§315
In the model of natural law that we will follow here the features of the world derive their
existence, their existential status, from a strict functional dependence. Ultimately that dependence reduces to aspects of primitive nature.
§318
This strict dependence implies that the universal properties of the world are existentially distinct, the product of this uniformity alone.
No observable discontinuity in the uniformity of natural law.
§320
This uniformity of natural law is a base assumption of our model. We argue for this uniformity by observing the absence of observable discontinuity in the laws
of nature. Nowhere is there an observable discontinuity in natural law and our model would be falsified
by the discovery of one. For example, if we discover galaxies that function according to different
laws then this would be an observable discontinuity and our model will be falsified by
it.
Uniformity of natural law leads to similar yet distinct.
§321
The uniformity of natural law is the sole reason that there are similar things in the
world.
§322
Two diamonds, therefore, are existentially distinct. They form in nature independently and that they are at all similar is clear testimony to the
uniformity of natural law. A diamond and a tree are existentially distinct in exactly the same way.
§323
In our model each “molecule” of water in a body of water is existentially
distinct. A body of water is a reflection not of any relation between the molecular parts but simply of
this great uniformity.
§324
Natural properties of this kind are the product of this uniformity, functionally
dependent on a construction from primitive nature but the elements of that property are
strictly independent; quantum phenomena not withstanding14 .
Relations And EpistemologyA relation is entirely the product of apprehension. Relations solely the product of apprehension.
§326
In our model relations are solely the product of apprehension. They are present only as the result of the biophysical mechanics of sentience that we will
present.
Relations solely the product of our mechanics.
§329
Relations can be apprehended, they have epistemological status, but they do not
exist in the world beyond apprehension in the mechanics we describe.
Inventions emerge from assembly of parts.
§330
The product of invention, a television for example, emerges from the assembly of
its parts. There is clearly an identity between the apprehension of television-ness, that which
defines a television, and the apprehension of the physical assembly of a
television, what it is to be a television.
Televisions do not exist in the world beyond apprehension.
§331
Television-ness is an essential property of the apprehended assembly alone. It is not a property of the world as a whole. Television-ness has epistemological status but a television has no existential status beyond
its apprehension. A television is not actually existent in the world. The physical assembly of a television corresponds merely to an apprehensible assembly of
parts.
Experience in a different category.
§332
Properties like television-ness and experience are in distinct categories. Television-ness, in particular, is a property dependent upon the existence of experience not
only in that one has to possess experience for it to have any relevance in the world, but
also in that it is the product of conscious intelligence. A television does not exist if there is no-one to apprehend it.
Compared to properties arising from uniform laws.
§333
Television-ness is also distinct from the properties of the world that emerge from the
uniformity of natural law. What we call “fluid” and “solid” exist without our
participation in the world. In our model they have existential status in deference to their construction from primitive
nature alone. Any perceived relation is entirely the product of apprehension.
The Uniqueness of ExperienceThe distinct place of experience in the world. Fluids and solids from a uniformity in natural law.
§334
In our existential model fluids and solids arise in the world because of a great uniformity
in natural law. They are features of the world that recur widely and this recurrence is testimony to that
great uniformity.
§335
They are not constant. In their own state they transform under the laws of nature and they may transform under those
laws from one to another, fluids become solids and vice versa.
§336
These are features that continue to play a role in the world.
Emergence suggests experience arises similarly.
§337
Emergence theorists[25] have argued that experience
may arise in nature in the same manner as fluids and solids15 .
§339
For this to be true in any model experience would have to be the consequence of the
uniformity of natural law. It would have to transform to other forms and play a continuing role in the physics of the
world. Yet experience in emergence models has no such role. It is merely present, a dualism. It is a logical construction that ends with the claim “and then magic happens
here.”
Emergence theory logically inadequate.
§340
The position of emergence theory is logically inadequate and amounts to a direct appeal to magic. As Penrose suggested earlier there is nothing in our current physical models that leads
us, logically and constructively, to experience as a property arising from some
assembly.
No transform to other forms.
§342
Unlike solids and fluids there is no transformation in emergence theory from experience to
any other form. There is no logical reduction or constructive route to experience and no role given to it. Whereas, the appearance of fluids and solids, while picturesque, is clearly not magical and
these forms continue to play a role in the physics of the world.
Experience logically distinct.
§343
Experience is a necessary distinction. And while we will argue here that the various forms of sense are in fact characterized by
forms of mass/energy, we find a clear necessary distinction for the essence from
which those senses arise and a role for it in the formation of physical
structure.
Emergence abandons the systematization of nature.
§344
A failure to consider the revision of our physical models has led emergence theorists to
suggest that “When you go to a higher level, the lower level may be
irrelevant.” The suggestion is that, by this failure of reduction within the limited materialist
construction, we abandon the rigorous systematization of nature by science and break
the natural chain of functional dependence to produce a supernatural account.
The Rise of ComplexityWhere does all the complexity of the things we call “living” come from?
§345
Consider a final example: an apple.
Apple-ness not like television-ness.
§346
Clearly an apple is not a product of intelligence, as all things in our model it
derives in a construction from primitive nature according to natural law. But apple-ness is not at all like television-ness. Nor is its form readily explained by the brute force and uniformity in physics that produces
the elements or fluid forms of them.
§347
The diversity of apples, of fruit and of all living forms, suggests that something
else is going to disrupt the great uniformity in natural law as seen in the partial
cosmology that includes fluids and solids.
§348
Where does all the complexity of “living” things manifest on this planet
come from? What brings it about? How are we to describe the mechanics that enables nature to produce the variety of sense?
Hard questions lead to acts of desperation.
§349
Frustration over hard questions like these has led emergence theorists to consider the
possibility of “and then magic happens here.” But, from our point of view, to consider such magic viable is to undermine the
principles of good science. It is an act of desperation.
False expectations by applying established ideas.
§350
Oh, we have some inductive expectation that apples are constructed in the
same way that fundamental elements are, in a continuum of increasing
complexity, but this expectation has weak foundations.
§351
We understand many of the mechanisms involved in the assembly of an apple and its
function. We know that it is a product, at least in part, of the substantive
essence, of energy/mass. We know that its form is, at least in part, the product of gravitation.
§352
However, the origin of an apple is not readily explained by our established
ideas. There is something else going on, a different kind of mechanics, that is not
evident in the formation of the elements and their solid or fluid forms. These are simply the product of nature's brute force and the uniformity of natural law. There is something more delicate and subtle going on.
The Business of ThinkingExperience and logical machines. Science relies upon assumptions about apprehension.
§353
All of science relies upon the nature of logic and apprehension. Indeed, human understanding of any kind, be it philosophic, religious, or scientific, relies upon our base assumptions concerning what is happening when we apprehend
the world. It relies upon our assumptions about what is really going on when we sense the world.
§354
We make natural inferences, we anticipate, we
predict. Those predictions are intimately bound to action, to our response. Conventions of all kinds shape the nature of this anticipation and action to form the foundation
of our individual understanding and our behavior.
§355
The foundations of logic are built upon our understanding of apprehension and what is
apprehensible. This understanding relies upon how we view the existence of experience and what we consider to be
its place in the world. This foundation is fundamental to our navigation of and our survival in the world. It is the basis of any epistemology.
Experience cannot be apprehended.
§356
Yet experience itself cannot logically be apprehended. Simply, we cannot experience experience. Experience cannot be the subject of experience. We simply experience.
No role found for experience in logic.
§357
For all of this, contemporary logic, and most especially its manifestation
in computer science, has no place and no role for experience. It has reduced to nominalism and the mechanics of symbolic integration16 . It has disregarded the original foundations of logic from George Boole to Rudolf Carnap, a reduction to experience, sense.
§362
At best, due primarily to the work of Gottlob Frege, logic has yielded explanation in exchange for subjectivism, a form
of dualism in which experience is an unexplained end in itself but otherwise provides a
conception of meaning that has no role in the world.
The unfulfilled promise of logic.
§364
Our advances in the utilization of current symbolic computation and our stalled consideration of
the foundations of logic have left behind an unfulfilled promise. That promise was best articulated at the birth of computer science by Charles Sanders Peirce. In 1887 he noted the opportunity that the invention of logical machines afforded.
| ❝ |
§366
Precisely how much of the business of thinking a machine could possibly be made to perform,
and what part of it must be left for the living mind, is a question not without conceivable
practical importance; the study of it can at any rate not fail to throw needed light on the
nature of the reasoning process.
§367
Though the machines of Jevons and of Marquand were designed chiefly to illustrate more
elementary points, their utility lies mainly in the evidence they afford concerning this
problem.
Charles Sanders Peirce. Logical Machines. (1887) |
§368
The machines that Peirce refers to here17 are the early machines, constructed mainly of wooden mechanisms, by William Stanley
Jevons and Peirce's student Allan Marquand. They utilized the first physical representations of Boole's logic.
§370
Conventional computing machines have certainly thrown light upon the nature of reasoning
processes and they have endowed us with productive mathematical and social tools. Yet the question of the identity of that part of thinking that must be left for the living mind
is neglected, widely considered irrelevant or the subject of fantastic invention.
The frustration of grounding logic.
§371
The opportunity that Peirce foresaw is unfulfilled and the frustration it affords in best
reflected in comments made some years later made by Rudolf Carnap and first published in 1928[26].
| ❝ |
§372
The question is this: provided that to all or some types of psychological processes there
correspond simultaneous processes in the central nervous system, what connects the processes
in question with one another? Very little has been done toward a solution to the correlation
problem of the psychophysical relation, but, even if this problem were solved (i.e., if we
could infer the characteristics of a brain process from the characteristics of a
psychological process, and vice versa), nothing would have been achieved to further the
solution of the essence problem (i.e., the psychophysical problem). For this problem is not concerned with the correlation, but with the essential relation; that
is, with that which “essentially” or “fundamentally”
leads from one process to the other or which brings forth both from a common root.
§373
...there still remain, in the main, three hypotheses: mutual influence, parallelism, and
identity in the sense of the two aspect theory.
§374
Three contradicting and unsatisfactory answers and no possibility of finding or even
imagining an empirical fact that could here make the difference: a more hopeless situation
can hardly be imagined.
Rudolf Carnap. P. 37-38,The Logical Structure of the World. (1928) |
§375
These comments reflect the frustration of our position as it continues today.
Our StoryA summary of the historical narrative.
§376
This brings us to the narrative that we will present. It concerns the distinction between two world views in mathematical logic, the
distinction between logic as the integration of the parts and logic as a differentiation from
the entirety of sense. The conflict in these world views is represented by the two most influential logicians of the
twentieth century: Rudolf Carnap, and Alan Turing.
Rudolf CarnapThe rise of positivism. Experience taken seriously before 1950.
§377
Before the 1950's the existence of experience was taken seriously by logicians and
scientists. For the mathematicians interested in questions of apprehension in the foundations of
geometry such as Henri Poincaré[27], for pragmatists influenced by Charles Sanders Peirce[28], for the logical positivists and empiricists of the renowned Vienna Circle
and Berlin Schools, for physicists such as Ernst Mach and Albert Einstein, and for those
later concerned with interpretations of quantum theory the existence of experience was a
central and dominant concern.
§379
Both positivism and empiricism necessarily imply a reduction to experience, though the nature of that
final reduction has never been clear.
Leaving room for new discoveries about perception.
§382
In particular, the advocacy of physicalism by logical positivists such as Rudolf Carnap rests upon a pragmatic and
fundamental understanding. It is an understanding that appeals to the scientific method and that reduced to
characterized experience, to sense. The physicalism advocated by Carnap sought a naturalistic basis and anticipated extensions to
our physical models as we made new discoveries about perception. These discoveries he anticipated would allow an explanation of experience in nature.
Carnap's physicalism is not materialist.
§387
The physicalism of Rudolf Carnap is not materialism. As noted earlier, the materialism of modern conception assumes that we have identified all the essential things of
the world.
§389
In our unqualified use of the term “physicalism” here we refer to the
physicalism of Rudolf Carnap. This we qualify as liberal physicalism and not the type physicalism of identity theory advocated by Carnap's colleague Herbert Feigl.
Verifiable and derived from natural law.
§392
Carnap took the first thesis of physicalism to be simply that claims about the world can be
confirmed by others. He rejected the idea that you can have private knowledge, gifts from God, that
cannot ultimately be shared, rigorously systematized, and confirmed. He took the second thesis of physicalism to be that the laws of nature, including those for
organisms and their behaviors, are logical consequences of natural physical laws.
“Those laws which hold in nature.”
§393
He clarified this by saying:
| ❝ |
§394
This thesis does not refer to the laws known to us at present, but to those laws which
hold in nature and which our knowledge can only more or less approximate. The thesis may therefore be understood as the hypothesis that in the future it will
become possible to an ever greater extent to derive known extra-physical laws from known
physical laws.
§395
It is true that these two theses of physicalism go far beyond the present possibility of
reducing extra-physical concepts and laws to physical ones. These do not represent firmly established knowledge but sweeping extrapolating
hypotheses.
Rudolf Carnap. P.883,The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap: The Library of Living Philosophers. (1963) |
§396
This is a view that allows for new discovery.
Carnap rejects emergence theory.
§397
He goes on to affirm my own rejection of claims in emergence theory[29]:
| ❝ |
§398
As a specific argument against the doctrine of emergentism, which has been adopted even
by some empiricists, I should like to emphasize in this context the philosophically
important fact that scientific investigations demonstrate ever more clearly a continuity
in the evolution of man. We may think, e.g., of the development of quasi-organic entities from inorganic
substances, further of viruses, one-cell organisms, higher organisms, and finally human
beings. All empiricists have abandoned the earlier belief that there is a fundamental difference,
a “difference in kind” , between man and other animals, and between
organisms and the inorganic world. Nobody denies that there are differences and that they are of very great importance both
theoretically and practically. But these differences have no sharp boundary lines: they are differences of degree within
a continuum. It is possible, of course, to draw a line by definition between human beings and other
animals; but any such line is to some extent arbitrary, that is to say, the line might
be drawn with just as good reasons somewhat later or somewhat earlier. The traditional discontinuity views had their historical source in certain magical and
religious beliefs, and these views lingered on for quite some time after the magical and
religious beliefs from which they originated had been abandoned. It seems to me that emergentism has a similar character. There is no doubt that emergentism can be formulated in a non-metaphysical, meaningful,
and scientific way. Yet I doubt that there is any good objective reason for drawing a sharp boundary at some
point and declaring: “At exactly this place and time the first sensation (or:
the first sensation of red) occurred.” Such a declaration may be justified on the basis of a psychophysical dualism, understood
not as an ontological thesis, but as a proposal for the use of a dualistic language. Although I would strongly disagree with such a dualistic emergentism, I think it is more
coherent than the non-dualistic version of emergentism which is defended by some
empiricists. Once dualism is abandoned, there seems to be no good reason for the position which
singles out the occurrence of certain new micro-structures from that of others and
declares that the former are connected with new qualities or sense-data while the later
are just new physical structures. If we could study the development from inorganic matter to man in detail, down to the
physical micro-structure of all bodies, we would find new micro-structures all the
time. Many of them show dispositions for responses of higher and higher degrees of integration
(in a vague sense not easy to explicate). If the degree of integration is sufficiently high, it is customary to speak of organic
responses (again in a vague sense). Finally, there are certain kinds of tissues customarily called nerve tissues; in
terrestrial organisms, we find all responses of a very high degree of integration to be
connected with tissues of this kind. But we do not know whether this connection holds for all higher organisms in other parts
of the universe. Hence, we do not know whether the occurrence of this kind of tissue may be taken as an
essential criterion of higher degrees of integration. In any case, the possible degrees of integration form a continuum. Therefore it would be arbitrary to draw a sharp line at one particular value of the
degree of integration and to say that from here on all of the more highly integrated
responses are accompanied by, or are themselves to be regarded as,
“mental” events, (e.g., “sensations” ) or are
“conscious” , whereas all responses of lower degree are not. Here, as in the case of the concepts of organism and of man, the discontinuity view, when
held by those who have abandoned dualism, seems to be due solely to an after affect of
the abandoned position.
Rudolf Carnap. P.883,The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap: The Library of Living Philosophers. (1963) In his response to Herbert Feigl on Physicalism. |
Carnap takes experience seriously but did not know how to proceed.
§399
It should be clear then that the physicalism expressed by Carnap reflects a monist view that
there are no fundamental divisions and a positive view that all is open to a unified
scientific explanation. Carnap takes experience seriously as existentially essential. He simply did not know how to proceed.
Alan TuringExcitement over conventional computation and the rise of objectivism. Experience neglected after 1950.
§400
In the 1950s a ruthless and supernatural objectivism began to take hold in
which, despite the mandate of empiricism, the existential questions surrounding
experience are marginalized and eliminated from the agenda of science.
§401
This happens primarily because logical techniques, that Carnap had made significant
contributions to, provided immediate benefits that enabled the revolution in computing
devices and the economic benefits they brought with them.
Seductive success of computing devices.
§402
The advantages of the effective techniques established in the work of Alan Turing[30], Alfred Tarski[31][32], and Claude Shannon[33] seemed so powerful and so
productive that they appeared to be able to solve quite literally everything18 .
§407
Alan Turing offered a useful notion of computation and took a first step toward reasoning
about intelligence without recourse to sense or experience[34]. Alfred Tarski offered a notion of truth, eliminating experience in his definitions[35]. Claude Shannon developed a mathematical theory of communication that led to the foundation of
information theory[36]. None ever found, or in Shannon's case needed, a place for experience in their
developments. And perhaps all of them are victims of subsequent over-simplification and a generalization
that neglects the goals and boundaries of their original inquiry.
Turing's influence profound.
§408
Alan Turing's influence is the most profound. His broad consideration to the questions of consciousness is widely misrepresented[37].
§409
Turing's objectives are practical and more modest than are widely reported. He was challenged by the presence of experience and recognized the limits of his
proposals. He sought primarily to take clear and rigorous first steps toward understanding the problem
of the mind. He took up Peirce's vision. Unfortunately, subsequent advocates have conveniently ignored Turing's own separation of
issues and acknowledgment that questions remained unanswered.
Turing puts “consciousness” aside to enable progress.
§410
Turing felt that certain mysteries related to consciousness did not need to be explained
before the question he sought to address could be answered. That question was whether a machine could be as intelligent as you or me:
| ❝ |
§411
I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about
consciousness. There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected with any attempt to
localise it. But I do not think these mysteries necessarily need to be solved before we can answer the
question with which we are concerned in this paper.
Alan Turing. Computing Machinery and Intelligence. (1950) |
§412
We will argue that this was, in fact, a fundamental mistake that is unmitigated by
the practical success of his models. As a result, we will argue that there are fundamental limits to Turing's model of
computation.
Reclaiming ExperienceReclaiming the existential necessity of experience. Foundational questions put aside.
§413
The central point of this narrative is that while the practical contributions of Turing and
others had clear and immediate benefits a consideration that had been of principal concern
in science, and more particularly in the foundations of logic, was subsequently
neglected.
§414
That consideration had simply been put aside by Turing for purely practical reasons, in the
interest of more immediate progress.
§415
Unfortunately, in the sixty year period since 1950 the field of logic has
stagnated with questions at the foundations that remain neglected. The product of that neglect is systemic. Despite the flurry of interest around computer science, and perhaps because of
it, logic is generally considered “a done deal” with little more to
be said except in those uninteresting (sic) quiet and unfunded
corners of the foundations of mathematics.
§416
In the past sixty years Logic has made no advance as profound as those in the previous one
hundred years since Boole. Logic proper, following Frege[38] and Lewis[39] not Peirce or Carnap, has mostly (as far as I can
tell) resolved to a subjectivist philosophy of intension. It is a philosophy in which Logic observes no difference in the world beyond a change to
sense and there is no conception of how such a difference relates to action.
§418
By our definitions such Logic is meaningless and in stark contrast to the fact that its
implementation in semiconductors has proven useful. In this role the syntax and semantics of Logic has found meaning as a rigorous language able
to articulate the integration of machine inputs and order the switching in computing
machinery. But in this role it is missing any differentiation or cognition and has no sense. Thus while it is the case that in its role as an engineering language Logic is rich with
meaning it is disconnected in this role from Logic proper.
§419
Before 1950 science took the existential questions surrounding experience seriously. Led by people like Rudolf Carnap of the Vienna Circle and its advocacy of a logical
positivism the sentences of science were viewed as marks describing structure and behavior
that can be verified by an individual's experience of the world.
Evolving from strict solipsism.
§420
This strict solipsism, the view that one's own sense is all that can ultimately be
relied upon, was later rejected. It was not rejected because solipsism is fundamentally wrong but simply because logical
inference is more powerful than at first considered.
§421
Intuitive inference arising from genetic disposition, inductive inference arising from what we have sensed before, and deductive inference arising from rigorous and systematic methods allow us to expand beyond a dependence on direct experience. Inference allows us to discover that which lies beyond our direct experience.
§422
We will show that there is nothing magical about prediction, inference in all its
forms is a natural product of the mechanics we propose.
The existence of experience warrants explanation.
§423
The techniques of Shannon, Tarski, and Turing in logic and computation has proved useful. They have allowed us to apply effective techniques of thinking in mechanized symbolic
systems. But we have become over excited by our success and this usefulness has distracted us from the
fundamental issue. We appear to have forgotten that empiricism fundamentally relies upon the existence of
experience and that existence warrants explanation.
An inconvenient and embarrassing fact for logic.
§424
For a generation of logicians and physicists the existential challenge of experience has
become an inconvenient and embarrassing fact. It is manifest to all of us. Yet it is difficult to deal with or to identify any role that it may play.
The expectations in AI cannot be met.
§425
Contemporary optimism, in the practice of Artificial Intelligence for example, is founded
upon the premise that our physical models are complete. These expectations, based on the premises of emergence already discussed, cannot be met for
reasons that are fundamental to the world.
There is no imminent “singularity.”
§426
The technological “singularity” of Ray Kurzweil is merely a technologist's fantasy[40]. There is no imminent artificial intelligence comparable to the capabilities of our
species. And this is quite simply because this intelligence is not merely heuristics or
self-reference. There is something fundamental to cognition and recognition that is unaccounted for in this
work. Human-level intelligence requires that we first understand the basis of intelligence: the deeply connected mechanisms of sense and motility in biology.
Experience must play a role in the formation of the world.
§428
We appear to have missed the obvious and simple fact that an explanation of the existence of
experience requires that we identify a role for experience in the formation of the world. There must be a role for the essence of experience in the formation of organisms in general
and senses in particular. For if we cannot identify such a role then it is simply beyond scientific explanation and the
matter here can never be resolved.
§429
This is a position we stubbornly refuse to accept.
NEXT: Our method of attack, including and informal discussion and summary of the formal
approach. |